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TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER COLLECTION
SUITS BY LOCAL MERCHANTS AND LENDERS:




Merchants provide goods and services but payment is not received.
Customer accounts become overdue and delinquent. A debtor's
checks are dishonored or returned for lack of funds. These are
typical collection problems encountered by local or community
businesses. State courts, particularly small claims courts, are the
traditional forums for collecting these business debts. Yet in
many western states there exist court systems separate and apart
from the state courts. These other courts are Indian tribal courts.
North Dakota is a western state with a significant Indian
population.' There are five tribal court systems in North Dakota,
and each functions as part of a separate reservation government.
The existence of many diverse Indian legal systems made North
Dakota an ideal place for this research on the interaction between
local businesses and reservation courts.2
* Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law; J.D., 1975,
University of Idaho. Prior to joining the faculty at North Dakota, Professor Trentadue
was associated counsel for the non-Indian petitioners in the landmark case of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Professor Trentadue is currently on leave
from the University of North Dakota, and is practicing law with the firm of Berman and
O'Rorke, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The author is grateful to all individuals and institutions who contributed to this pro-
ject and without whom this study could not have been completed. These would necessar-
ily include the tribal court personnel, local merchants, financial officers, and attorneys
who gave of their time by submitting to personal interviews or answering questionnaires.
There are others, however, who merit special thanks, especially Dr. Larry Dobesh,
Director of the University of North Dakota's Bureau of Business and Economic
Research, who gave much encouragement and support throughout a difficult and often
controversial research project. The author also owes a considerable debt to Sherry King,
Assistant Executive Director, State Bar Association of North Dakota, who contributed
data on North Dakota attorneys; and to Judges Lawrence Joshua and J.A. Chaske, and
Clerk of Court Myra Hunt, who patiently explained the functioning of the Fort Totten
Tribal Court.
I. According to 1980 national census data, Indians comprise approximately 3 per-
cent (3. 1 %) of the total North Dakota population. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SUP-
PLEMENTARY REPORT, AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: 1980 CEN-
SUS OF POPULATION 24 (1984). Nationally, persons of Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut ancestry
comprise less than one-half of 1 percent (.0062%) of the total United States resident
population. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 31 (105th ed. 1985).
2. For the initial results of this research, see Trentadue, The Role of Indian Tribal
I
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Research Objectives
The primary objective of this study was to determine the role,
if any, that Indian courts play in the collection practices of local
businesses. In addition to compiling and analyzing data on the
jurisdiction and use of these particular Indian court systems for
debt collection, this research also focused upon the potential
tribal courts have for the recovery of business debts.
It was not an objective of this project to evaluate tribal courts
on fairness, procedure, or results,3 nor does this study purport to
do so. Instead, the emphasis was on how tribal courts were
perceived in terms of fair treatment, just results, and overall pro-
cedures by those persons who either have used or are likely to use
Indian courts for collecting business debts. That a tribal court
may be viewed as unfair by local merchants and lenders does not
mean the opinion is either accurate or well founded. Should such
an attitude exist, however, it would be significant.
If tribal courts are seen as unfair, unjust, or unreliable by a
certain class of litigant, these persons are not likely to use the
reservation court system. Moreover, business owners who distrust
Indian courts might not freely extend credit if default will
necessitate looking to a tribal legal system for collection.
Therefore, additional goals of this research were to explore the
attitudes of local business owners toward tribal courts and to
consider the possibility that a negative opinion by these persons
results in a denial of credit when nonpayment would require them
to bring suit in an Indian court.
Research Methodology
A tripartite format was used to accomplish the research objec-
Courts in the Collection of Business Debts: Tool or Bane of Local Business?, N.D. ECON.
STUDIES, No. 39 (1985). Although this project was funded in part by a grant from the
University of North Dakota's Bureau of Business and Economic Research, and further
supported by the North Dakota State Bar Association, these institutions did not direct or
control the empirical research. Nor do the author's opinions and conclusions presented in
this study necessarily reflect those of these sponsoring institutions.
3. Several studies have been done on Indian courts, but these generally focus upon
the needs of tribal court systems rather than their fairness or judicial competence. See,
e.g., AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROG., INC., INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE
ROLE OF TRIBAL COURTS (1977); 2 NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, JUSTICE AND
THE AMERICAN INDIAN: THE INDIAN JUDICIARY AND THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS (1974). See generally NATL AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS'N, INDIAN COURTS
AND THE FUTURE (1978). But see S. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COST
OF SEPARATE JUSTICE (1978) (a study highly critical of Indian courts including several




tives of this study. First, the jurisdictional parameters of the
various tribal courts were determined because a court that lacks
the authority to hear collection actions cannot be of use to local
businesses. This determination of tribal court jurisdiction was
made for four possible categories of litigants: (1) Indian creditor
and Indian debtor; (2) Indian creditor and non-Indian debtor; (3)
non-Indian creditor and Indian debtor; and (4) non-Indian
creditor and non-Indian debtor. Identifying a tribal court's civil
jurisdiction over these types of cases required a review and
analysis of federal Indian policy, treaties, and tribal codes and
constitutions, as well as federal and state constitutions and
legislative acts.
Second, all North Dakota lawyers having offices on or within
50 miles of an Indian reservation were surveyed about their ex-
periences with and attitudes toward tribal court collection suits.
A 50-mile survey radius was selected because only those attorneys
practicing near a reservation are likely to represent local business
owners in tribal court. This survey was designed to collect litiga-
tion data from the previous year (1984), and it was conducted by
means of a written questionnaire." Data from these question-
naires were separately compiled for each tribal court, and to en-
sure candid answers the respondents were allowed to remain
anonymous.
Third, in-person and telephone interviews were conducted with
tribal court personnel and local business owners. These interviews
had a twofold purpose: (1) to obtain data on the use of tribal
courts by banks, savings and loans, and merchants during 1984;
and (2) to discover the opinions, if any, these local business peo-
ple held about tribal court.
I. Tribal Courts
American Indians have formed and are continuing to form
their own reservation governments, and these governments are at-
tempting to exercise authority over a broad range of social,
political, and economic activities.5 A key appendage of this asser-
4. Questionnaires were mailed to 372 attorneys. Responses were received from 186
attorneys.
S. The scope and validity of these efforts to exercise tribal authority have been ex-
tensively litigated by non-Indians. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130 (1982) (corporate challenges to tribal mineral extraction tax); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (state of Washington's opposition to
tribal sales tax and automobile licensing); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978) (resisting application of tribal criminal code to non-Indians); Cardin v. De La
No. I1]
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tion of tribal power has been the emergence of an Indian court
system.' This legal system, however, did not develop in a
vacuum. It is a product of decades of changing and varied federal
Indian policy.
Federal Indian Policy and the Development of Tribal Courts
Congress forever altered the independent status of tribal en-
tities in 1871 when it passed legislation providing that Indian
tribes would no longer be recognized or acknowledged as in-
dependent nations with whom the United States would contract
by treaty.7 This act marked a dramatic shift in federal Indian
policy. The federal government had previously negotiated with
tribes as though they were foreign nations; many of the early
treaties were extremely conciliatory toward the Indians.' By 1871,
though, the United States had expanded both geographically and
militarily, and several foreign wars and a civil war had been
fought and won. The decision to deal no longer with tribes as
foreign nations undoubtedly reflected a determination on the part
of the United States that Indians were at last a conquered and
dependent people.
Congress passed a General Allotment Act in 1887. 9 Also
known as the Dawes Act, this law initiated a policy of assimila-
tion for the Indians.'" The Dawes Act provided that individual
Indians were to be allotted parcels of reservation land with title
held in trust by the federal government.I' Throughout the trust or
wardship period the land was restricted and could not be en-
Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (non-Indian business con-
testing regulation under tribal building and safety code); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe
Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982) (attacking tribal zoning law prohibiting non-
Indian development).
6. See AM. INDIAN LAW. TRAINING PROG., supra note 3. The power to establish an
Indian court system is derived from a tribe's retained sovereignty. See, e.g., Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (Oglala Sioux Tribal Court was estab-
lished under Indians' retained sovereign powers rather than an act of Congress). See infra
notes 107-168 for a discussion of retained tribal sovereignty.
7. This law specifically provided that treaties ratified before Mar. 3, 1871, would
not be invalidated or impaired. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of Mar.
3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566).
8. See, e.g., Treaty with Delaware Nation, 7 Stat. 13 (1778) (forgiving prior of-
fenses by the Indians; requiring Delaware Tribe to assist the United States in war; offer-
ing tribe possibility of r'epresentation in Congress).
9. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
10. See S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 95-107 (1973).
11. Seech. 119, §§ 1, 5, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
[Vol. 13
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cumbered or sold by the Indian allottee, but after the expiration
of twenty-five years the allottee was given fee simple title and
United States citizenship.' 2 Once unrestricted title was received,
an Indian landowner could sell or mortgage his or her property.'
3
Though exercise of this power of alienation by Indian allottees,
non-Indians acquired title to reservation lands and thus came into
increasing contact with tribal governments."'
The 1920s and 1930s witnessed still another shift in federal In-
dian policy, this time away from assimilation and toward self-
government. Indians were granted United States citizenship in
1924.11 In 1934 the Indian Reorganization Act became law,' 6 and
with its passage the keel for modern tribal self-government was
laid.
Commonly known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, the 1934 In-
dian Reorganization Act is perhaps the single most important
piece of Indian legislation.' 7 This law prohibited further allot-
12. Id. §§ 5, 6 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982)).
13. See id. § 5. See generally United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) (Indians
have no right to make contracts respecting allotted lands).
14. The Dawes Act was not the only means by which non-Indians acquired reserva-
tion land. In concert with the General Allotment Act, the federal government entered in-
to an extensive period of reducing Indian ownership of reservations and making this
"surplus land" available to non-Indians. E.g., Act of Apr. 12, 1924, ch. 93, 43 Stat. 93
(sale of property no longer needed for tribal administration); Act of May 31, 1918, ch.
88, § 2, 40 Stat. 592 (sale of lots on Fort Hall Reservation); Act of Feb. 27, 1917, ch. 133,
39 Stat. 945 (agricultural entries on tribal lands). By 1934 when the allotment system
finally ended, Indians had parted with title to 90 million acres of former reservation
lands, presumably to non-Indians. See H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
See also Act of Feb. 14, 1913, ch. 54, 37 Stat. 675 (sale of surplus land on Standing Rock
Reservation); Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455 (sale of surplus land on Fort Ber-
thold Reservation); Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1620, 33 Stat. 319, 321 (providing for
disposition of former Devil's Lake Reservation land under general provisions of
homestead and townsite laws). See generally Act of May 17, 1900, ch. 479, § 1, 31 Stat.
179 (free homesteads for settlers on former Indian lands).
15. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
16. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§
461-491 (1982)).
17. Not only does the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 provide a mechanism for
creating a formal tribal governmental structure, but tribes organized under this law
qualify for a variety of federal benefits. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 488 (1982) (organized
tribes qualify for loans from the Farmers Home Administration Direct Loan Account).
Once a tribe organizes under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and is a recognized
governing unit, it may qualify for federal aid and grants along with other units of local
government. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5303 (1982) (community development moneys); 31 U.S.C.
§ 6701(a)(5)(B) (1982) (federal revenue sharing). Although it may come as a surprise to
many, there are tribes that have not been recognized by the federal government. See, e.g.,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
ment of reservation lands,' and it continued indefinitely the trust
status on lands previously allotted but to which fee simple title
had not issued.' 9 However, the real significance of the Wheeler-
Howard Act was that it authorized tribes to organize, adopt
tribal constitutions, and incorporate and function as units of
local government.
20
Tribal termination was the legislative goal of the 1950s when,2'
in yet another change in policy, Congress attempted to transfer
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands to
the states. 22 Public Law 83-280 was a key instrument in this effort
to terminate tribal government.23 This Act pro'Vided two means
whereby states could acquire control over reservation lands and
Indians. First, to Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin, Congress granted civil and criminal
jurisdiction over some or all of the reservations located in these
states and the Indians residing upon them.
2
1
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (unrecognized group of In-
dians claiming compensation from the United States for the taking of timber from lands
claimed by them); Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 755 (1935) (nontreaty Indians seeking compensation for alleged taking of tribal
lands by the United States).
Tribes can be recognized through treaty, statute, or executive order. As long as a tribe
remains unrecognized, its members are legally indistinguishable from other non-Indian
citizens. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (Bureau of Indian Affairs
employment preference was for members of federally recognized tribes; not a racial group
consisting of Indians). Members of unrecognized tribes may likewise be fully subject to
state governmental authority. Cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Res., 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1979) (nonmember Indians were subject to the state of
Washington's taxing authority). Fortunately, though, identifiable but previously
unrecognized groups of Indians have a procedure for becoming a federally recognized
tribe. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 83, §§ 83.1 to 83.11 (1985) ("Procedures For Establishing That
An American Indian Group Exists As An Indian Tribe"). Authority even exists for
creating a reservation for "newly" recognized tribes. See 25 U.S.C. § 467 (1982)
(authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to proclaim new Indian reservations).
18. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §
461 (1982)).
19. Id. § 2 (current version codified at 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1982)).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477 (1982). A majority of tribal governments are organized
and formed pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
21. See S. TYLER, supra note 10, at 181-83. See generally Wilkinson & Briggs, The
Evolution of Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
22. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-89 (partially at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)).
23. See 2 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1044-46 (1984).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982) (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982) (civil
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/2
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The second method by which Public Law 83-280 proposed to
transfer control was through state assumption of jurisdiction.25
Public Law 83-280 authorized the remaining states to amend their
enabling acts and constitutions in order to assume such additional
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands as
their respective state legislatures deemed appropriate. 26 Some
states opted to assume jurisdiction over matters of particular con-
cern.27 Still others assumed broad civil and criminal jurisdiction
jurisdiction). Jurisdiction was granted to these particular states because most of the In-
dian tribes located there and practically all of the respective state officials were in agree-
ment over the transfer of power. See S. TYLER, supra note 10, at 183.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1983) (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982) (civil
jurisdiction).
26. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 6, 7, 67 Stat. 588. Public Law 83-280 merely
'vested states with additional civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and their lands.
Through a series of Supreme Court decisions it had already been established that states
had jurisdiction over non-Indians and their property even when located within the con-
fines of a tribal reservation. Public Law 83-280 had little if any effect upon this state
authority over non-Indians. See New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499 (1946)
("In the absence of limiting treaty obligation or Congressional enactment each state has a
right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries."); Utah & N.
Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (Territory of Idaho permitted to tax non-Indian-owned
property which passed through Fort Hall Reservation); United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621 (1881) (Colorado had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian who killed another
non-Indian within the boundaries of a reservation).
27. See, e.g., 1963 Wash. Laws ch. 36 (which obligated the state of Washington to
assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over eight subject areas and in other matters with
consent of the tribe). Now codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1964), that law pro-
vided:
The state of Washington hereby obliges and binds itself to assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within
this state in accordance with the consent of the United States given by the Act of
August 15, 1953 (Public Law 280, 83rd Congress, 1st Session), but such assumption of
jurisdiction shall not apply to Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands
within an established Indian reservations and held in trust by the United States or sub-
ject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, unless the provi-
sions of RCW 37.12.021 [tribal consent] have been invoked, except for the following:






(7) Dependent children; and
(8) Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads, and
highways: Provided further, That Indian tribes that petitioned for, were granted and
became subject to state jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter on or before March 13,
1963 shall remain subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction as if chapter 36, Laws
of 1963 had not been enacted.
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over reservations and Indians but later retroceded most of this
governmental authority. 28 A few states acquired no jurisdiction
pursuant to Public Law 83-280.29
North Dakota agreed to assume all additional jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian lands that the tribes or individual members
decided to delegate to the state.3 0 State law provided a mechanism
by which Indians could cede civil jurisdiction to the North
Dakota courts, 3' but this transfer of authority has apparently not
taken place on any North Dakota reservation.
2
1963 Wash. Laws ch. 36. The state of Idaho assumed similar jurisdiction. See 1963 Idaho
Sess. Laws ch. 58, § 1 (currently IDAHO CODE § 67-5101) (1980)).
28. See, e.g., 1961 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 464, §§ 1-4 (currently S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. §§ 1-1-18 to 1-1-21 (1980)).
29. For example, North Dakota agreed to assume all the civil or criminal jurisdiction
over Indians and their reservations that the tribe or individual members chose to delegate
to the state. N.D. CEN-r. CODE §§ 27-19-01 to 27-19-13 (Supp. 1985). But no such delega-
tion has taken place. See White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1973). North
Dakota did not, therefore, acquire any civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indians residing
within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation pursuant to Public Law 83-280.
See Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 143 (N.D. 1980) (no action has been taken
in North Dakota to acquire jurisdiction over Indians residing upon reservations pursuant
to Public Laws 83-280 or 90-284 and, consequently, the state obtained none).
North Dakota's Enabling Act required it to disclaim title to Indian lands. Act of Feb.
22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676 (enabling act for Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Washington). North Dakota's constitution also disclaims jurisdiction over
Indian lands. N.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(2). Although North Dakota did not otherwise
acquire jurisdiction over Indians pursuant to Public Law 83-280, state courts do have
jurisdiction over collection suits brought by Indians or the tribe against non-Indians, even
if the debt arose on the reservation. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305 (1986). The Wold decision did not, however, give state
courts any jurisdiction over reservation Indian debtors. See id. Assuming that individual
Indians or tribes are able to show the requisite jurisdiction, they can also sue in federal
court. See Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982)
(28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (diversity jurisdiction over Indian litigants). By law, federal
courts have expressly been given jurisdiction over many kinds of cases involving in-
dividual Indians or a tribe. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1353 (1982) (original jurisdiction over
any civil action involving Indian allotments); 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982) (federal courts can
hear civil actions brought by tribes whenever controversy arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-19-01 to 27-19-13 (Supp. 1985).
31. Id. §§ 27-9-02, 27-19-05 (1974).
32. See White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1973). Other states have
assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 83-280, and this extension of state authority over
Indians and their lands has been judicially approved. See, e.g., Washington v. Yakima In-
dian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (upholding Washington assumption of jurisdiction in
areas of compulsory school attendance, domestic relations, public assistance, mental ill-
ness, juvenile delinquency, adoption, dependent children, and motor vehicle regulation).
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The most recent congressional change in federal Indian policy
occurred with passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA). 3" This law launched the federal government on its pre-
sent course of tribal self-determination.3" The ICRA prohibited
further state assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 83-280
without the consent of the tribes affected;" it authorized those
states already having acquired civil and criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and their lands to retrocede this authority to the federal
government; 6 and it granted limited due process and other civil
rights to all persons subject to the authority of tribal govern-
ments. 7 Extending limited constitutional protections to those
persons subject to tribal authority was a very important aspect of
the ICRA.
If a person is subject to the authority of a tribal government,
and this would include tribal courts as well, state and federal con-
stitutional protections do not generally apply.3 ' The only rights
and safeguards available against abuses by tribal authorities are
those contained in the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act,39 and these
do not include the full panoply of constitutional rights normally
accorded United States citizens. 0 The Indian Civil Rights Act
does not, for example, prohibit the establishment of religion, nor
33. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, §§ 201 to 701, 82 Stat. 77-80 (current version codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1302-1326 (1982)).
34. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978). President Nixon
declared tribal termination a failure in 1970 and called upon Congress to enact legislation
whereby tribes would be permitted to manage their own affairs. See 116 CONG. REc.
23258 (1970). The 1970s witnessed a series of federal laws intended to foster tribal self-
government. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination & Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450-459 (1982); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982).
35. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, §§ 401, 402, 82 Stat. 78-79 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§
1321. 1322 (1982)).
36. Id. § 403, 82 Stat. 79 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982)).
37. Id. § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (current version codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982)).
38. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that federal constitu-
tional due process guarantees did not apply to Indian defendant under death sentence
from tribal court).
39. See Trans-Canada Enter. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476 (9th
Cir. 1980) (unless they are made explicitly binding by the Constitution or otherwise im-
posed by Congress, constitutional rights do not apply to the exercise of governmental
powers by an Indian tribe). Accord, Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 241-47 (9th Cir.
1974) (before passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, constitutional rights were
not applicable to Indian tribes and Indians living on reservations).
40. The full text of the rights imposed upon tribal governments by Congress reads as
follows:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
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does it require a trial in civil cases or the appointment of counsel
for indigent criminal defendants. 4' While Indian courts can no
longer impose the death sentence upon violators of tribal law,
they can punish with a fine of $500 and six months imprisonment
per offense.42 Moreover, the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act only
guarantees due process and equal protection of tribal law, not the
due process and equal protection of state or federal law.43
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no way impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or
both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982) (emphasis added).
41. See id. §§ (1), (6).
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982). Tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. As an obvious adjunct to the lack of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribal governments also lack the authority to seize non-
Indian property used in violation of tribal law. See, e.g., Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976) (tribal authorities lacked power to confiscate weapons of non-
Indians unlawfully hunting on tribal lands because seizures constituted a quasi-criminal
proceeding in violation of the tribal constitution which expressly limited tribal criminal
authority to members only).
The usual means of enforcing tribal law against non-Indians appears to be through the
federal courts. See, e.g., Knight, 670 F.2d at 900 (suit by Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes
to enforce tribal zoning laws). Indians who are not tribal members but happen to be upon
the reservation probably enjoy the same legal status as non-Indians and thus remain
beyond the tribe's criminal authority. Cf. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161 (for purposes of defin-
ing state taxing authority nonmember Indians were treated the same as non-Indians).
43. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978). Accord, Tom v.
Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976) (as used in the Indian Civil Rights Act,
"due process" and "equal protection" are construed with due regard for historical,
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/2
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The paucity of constitutional safeguards available to those per-
sons subject to tribal authority is a troublesome aspect of Indian
governments. Even more disturbing to most persons, however, is
the lack of a meaningful remedy for those who have been denied
the limited protections granted by the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Tribal governments enjoy sovereign immunity, and this insulates
them from most damage suits." Victims of tribal abuse cannot
seek redress under civil rights laws because these do not apply to
Indian governments."5 A federal writ of habeas corpus is the only
nontribal court remedy for correcting or preventing an Indian
tribe's violation of personal rights; federal courts lack the
authority to grant civil declaratory or injunctive relief.
6
There are definite limits on tribal authority, 7 and federal
courts do have jurisdiction to determine whether an Indian
government has exceeded its authority in a particular instance."8
Nevertheless, those seeking to redress an unlawful exercise of
tribal governmental power face an additional hurdle: They must
first exhaust the tribal remedies available to them before seeking
a federal forum.4
9
governmental, and cultural values of Indian tribe and, therefore, these terms are not
always given the same meaning as they come to represent under the United States Con-
stitution).
44. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58-59. A tribe's sovereign immunity can be limited only by
explicit tribal consent or congressional authorization. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian
Tribe, 519 F. Supp. 418, 424 (D. Ariz. 1981) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58). Indian
tribes do not implicitly waive their sovereign immunity by commencing an action. See,
e.g., Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 757 F.2d 1047,
1053 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 289 (1985) (by suing for declaratory
and injunctive relief, Chemehuevi Tribe did not consent to a counterclaim for tax moneys
allegedly due and owing to state of California).
45. See, e.g., R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap, 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983).
46. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59-72.
47. Tribal governmental powers may be limited by treaty, an act of Congress, or by
implication if the particular power is inconsistent with the status of Indians as a depen-
dent people. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. A tribe's jurisdiction may also be restricted
by its constitution or tribal code. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138
(1984).
48. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 105 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1985).
Jurisdiction is supplied by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (whether a tribe has exceeded the
limits of its civil or criminal governmental authority necessarily encompasses a substantial
federal question).
49. Id. at 2454. The Supreme Court indicated in National Farmers Union Ins. that it
would not be necessary for a petitioner to first exhaust tribal remedies when tribal
jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass, or is conducted in bad faith, or the action
is clearly in violation of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or when exhaustion would
otherwise be futile. See id. at 2454 n.21. There is, however, no exhaustion required for
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North Dakota Tribal Courts
Within the borders of North Dakota lie part or all of five In-
dian reservations,"0 and each has its own court system. These
reservations are: Fort Berthold Reservation, Fort Totten Reserva-
tion, Sisseton-Wahpeton (Lake Traverse) Reservation, Standing
Rock Reservation, and Turtle Mountain Reservation. Population
figures for these reservations are given in Table 1.
Table 1
North Dakota Reservation Populations*
Indians Total Indian Population Non-Indians
Reservation Living on Including Those Living Living on
Reservations Off-Reservation** Reservations
Fort
Berthold 2,640 3,081 2,937
Fort Totten 2,261 3,109 1,052
Sisseton-
Wah-
peton 24 299 1,945
Standing
Rock 2,341 4,017 1,279
Turtle
Mountain 4,021 9,583 290
* North Dakota reservation population figures were extracted from data compiled
during the. 1980 national census. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: 1980 CENSUS OF
POPULATION 24 (1984) (containing population statistics for identified reservations). These
figures, however, only include those Indians and non-Indians actually residing upon a
North Dakota reservation. Omitted from this table are those persons who happen to
reside upon portions of the Sisseton-Wahpeton or Standing Rock reservations located in
South Dakota.
** These totals represent Indians living either on the reservation or in nearby off-
reservation communities. These figures were obtained from data collected by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs. See U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN SERVICE POPULATION AND
LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES (1983).
nonmembers challenging tribal criminal authority through habeas corpus proceedings. See
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191.
50. See U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND
INDIAN TRUST AREAS 427-37, 502-04 (1974) (containing location, acreage, and Indian





Located in west-central North Dakota, Fort Berthold is home
to the Three Affiliated Tribes: Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan. 5'
The reservation was established by executive orders of Presidents
Grant and Hayes,52 and it now consists of approximately 980,500
acres of land. The Three Affiliated Tribes own 45,044 acres. In-
dividual Indians have been allotted 327,259 acres, and 174 acres
belong to the federal government. Non-Indians own 563,023
acres."
Tribal headquarters are located at New Town, North Dakota.
54
The Three Affiliated Tribes are organized under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.11 An elected tribal business council
is the governing body, 56 but only tribal members can hold elected
office or vote in tribal elections. 7 The tribal court claims civil
jurisdiction over any cause of action involving a tribal member if
it arises within the reservation boundaries or affects property
located within the reservation, and in all other cases in which the
litigants have consented to jurisdiction either in writing or
through conduct. 8 At the discretion of the tribal judge, a jury




Fort Totten Reservation is adjacent to Devil's Lake, North
51. Id. at 427.
52. 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 883 (1976).
53. U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 427.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES CONST. art. III.
57. Id., arts. II, IV.
58. FORT BERTOLD TRIBAL CODE, subch. I, § 2(d) (1980). Shortly after the empirical
research for this project was completed, the Three Affiliated Tribes amended their tribal
constitution to claim jurisdiction over "all persons and all lands" within the exterior
boundaries of the Fort Berthold Reservation. See THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES CONST. art I.
The tribes had previously amended their tribal code to vest the Fort Berthold Tribal Court
with civil jurisdiction over all causes of action arising within the reservation boundaries,
but this amendment was not reflected in the 1980 tribal code. See Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Wold Eng'g, 104 S. Ct. at 2271 n.l. For a discussion of the effect of tribal constitu-
tions and tribal codes upon tribal court subject matter jurisdiction, see infra notes 93,
167-168, 176 and accompanying text.
59. The Fort Berthold Tribal Code does not expressly provide for jury trials in civil
suits, but the trial judge may permit them at his discretion. The tribal code does allow
jury trials in criminal cases, but restricts jury participants to members only. See FORT
BERTHOLD R. CRIM. P. 23.
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Dakota. The reservation was created by treaty in 1867,60 and it is
occupied by the Santee and Teton Sioux.6' The Devil's Lake
Sioux Tribe claims title to 473 acres. Individual members have
been allotted a total of 47,640 acres. The federal government
owns approximately 1,800 acres. Non-Indians own 192,794 acres
of the original reservation lands.
6
1
A tribal council governs the reservation, and it is an elected
body.63 Nonmembers cannot hold tribal elected office or vote in
tribal elections. 64 Tribal headquarters are at Fort Totten, North
Dakota.65 The tribal court asserts civil jurisdiction over all per-
sons and causes submitted to it. 6 6 Jury trials are allowed in civil
suits, but nonmembers cannot serve on the jury.
6
Sisseton- Wahpeton (Lake Traverse) Reservation
Established by treaty in 1867, the Sisseton-Wahpeton (Lake
Traverse) Reservation was set aside for the Santee Sioux."
Although tribal headquarters are in Sisseton, South Dakota,
2,592 acres of the reservation extend into North Dakota. 69
An elected tribal council is the governing body?0 However,
only tribal members can hold elected tribal office or vote in tribal
elections.7" The tribal court claims civil jurisdiction when the
defendant is an Indian and in cases in which a non-Indian defen-
dant consents to tribal court jurisdiction.7 2 A jury trial is ap-
parently permitted in civil suits, but nonmembers cannot be
jurors.73
60. Act of Feb. 19, 1867, art. IV, 15 Stat. 505, 506.
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 430.
62. Id.
63. DEVIL'S LAKE Sioux TRIBE CONST. art. IV.
64. Id., arts. II1, V.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 430.
66. DEVIL'S LAKE Sioux TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE ch. I, tit. A, §§ 162(3), 202(1).
67. Id. § 203(1).
68. Act of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506. A substantial portion of the
original Lake Traverse Reservation was terminated pursuant to an agreement between the
Indians and Congress. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1035, 1036. Conse-
quently, these terminated lands passed back into state control. See DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 502.
70. SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX CONsT. art. III.
71. Id., art. II, § 1; art. V, §§ 2, 4.
72. SISSETON-WAHPETON LAW & ORDER CODE ch. II, §§ 2(c), (d) (1974).





Close to Bismarck, the Sioux Tribe's Standing Rock Reserva-
tion straddles the border between North Dakota and South
Dakota."" It was created by treaty and executive order of Presi-
dent Grant and encompasses 847,799 acres of land."' Tribal land
holdings consist of 294,840 acres. Approximately 542,700 acres
have been allotted to individual Indians. The federal government
owns 10,258 acres. There are apparently no published figures on
non-Indian land ownership.76
Tribal headquarters are located at Fort Yates, North Dakota.
The tribal government consists of an elected council. Tribal
members serve on the tribal council,"8 and tribal members are the
only persons authorized to vote in tribal elections." Standing
Rock Tribal Court asserts civil jurisdiction over cases in which all
the parties are Indian. Jurisdiction is also claimed in suits by a
non-Indian against a tribal member if the non-Indian is either a
resident of or doing business upon the reservation and the
amount in controversy does not exceed $300.0 The plaintiff in a
civil suit is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right, but if a
jury trial is permitted nonmembers cannot serve on the jury.8'
Turtle Mountain Reservation
Established by treaty and executive order of President
Arthur,' 2 the Turtle Mountain Reservation is situated in north-
central North Dakota. The reservation is occupied by the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa. 3 Of the total reservation acreage,
35,579 are owned by the tribe, and 34,144 acres have been al-
lotted. The federal government claims title to 517 acres. There
was an absence of published data on non-Indian land holdings."4
74. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 433.
75. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888, 889; 1 C. KAPPLER, supra note 52, at
884.
76. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 433.
77. Id.
78. STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIBAL CONST. art. II; art. IIn, §§ I, 4.
79. Id., art. V, § 1.
80. STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIBAL CODE OF JUSTICE § 1.2(c) (1980).
81. Id. §§ 11.4, 11.5(a).
82. Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 193, 194; 1 C. KAPPLER, SUpra note 52,
at 885.
83. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 50, at 435.
84. Id.
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Tribal headquarters are located at Belcourt, North Dakota,"5
and the governing body is a tribal council." Tribal members
vote,87 hold elected office," and serve on tribal juries." Non-
members are not permitted direct participation in tribal govern-
ment.
A right to a jury trial is present in any civil action involving
more than $200, but a jury trial is discretionary with the court
when the claim is less.9 The tribal court claims jurisdiction
over actions in which all the parties are Indians, and over suits in-
volving non-Indians to the extent they submit to the court's
authority by commencing suit or otherwise consenting to jurisdic-
tion. 91
II. Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Debtor-Creditor Cases
Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's right to exercise
judicial power over a particular kind of case.92 It is, in other
words, the court's authority to hear and decide disputes of a
specific type or character. Within the context of this study, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction would be the power of North Dakota
tribal courts to hear and decide debtor-creditor cases.
Parameters of Tribal Authority
When a tribe's constitution or tribal code limits the tribal court
in the type of cases it may hear, these restrictions on subject mat-
ter jurisdiction are binding. 93 Yet an Indian court will not
automatically have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits
merely because the tribal constitution or tribal code states it has
such authority. Rather, the tribal court's power to hear cases of a
specific character has its origins beyond the tribal code and con-
stitution. If North Dakota tribal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over collection actions involving Indians and non-
Indians, this authority will have three possible origins-treaty,
85. Id.
86. TURTLE MOUNTAIN CHIPPEWA TRIBAL CONST. art. IV.
87. Id., art. V.
88. Id.
89. TURTLE MOUNTAIN TRIBAL CODE § 2.0903 (1976).
90. Id. § 2.0901.
91. Id. 2.0102.
92. Kelly v. Nix, 329 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Iowa 1983).




congressional delegation, or inherent tribal sovereignty. These
same origins are the sources for all tribal governmental power.
Treaty
With the advice and consent of the Senate, the President is em-
powered to execute treaties. 9 Treaties are also the cornerstone of
Indian law. 9" Since treaties are on an equal footing with other
federal laws, 96 the supremacy clause dictates that they are
superior to all conflicting state law whether contained in state
constitutions or statutes." Thus the proper place to begin any in-
quiry into the extent of a tribe's power is the treaty or treaties
that tribe may have with the United States. If the authority
claimed can be found in a valid (i.e., ratified) treaty, the tribe has
the power in question, including the right to vest its courts with
subject matter jurisdiction.
Treaties negotiated between the United States and various In-
dian tribes do not generally license tribal courts with subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over collection suits, nor do these instruments
otherwise reference the judicial authority of the respective
tribes. 9" But these treaties do set aside land for the use of the In-
dians, and arguably, because a reservation was established for
them, Indians can impose the conditions under which persons will
be permitted to remain on reservation land. One condition is sub-
mission to the judicial authority of the tribal courts.
Compelling as this argument may seem, it is not likely to con-
stitute a general source of tribal court jurisdiction over collection
cases." 9 Similar arguments have been made by Indian govern-
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
95. The Constitution places a treaty on the same footing as any other act of Con-
gress. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, cl. 2. Both are the supreme law of the land and no
superior efficacy is given to one over the other. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888). If there is a conflict between a treaty and a federal law, as a general rule the last in
time controls. Id. at 194.
96. See 1 U.S. CONG., AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N FINAL REPORT 109
(1977); F. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 63 (R. Strickland ed. 1982). See
also Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (treaties are accorded equal dignity with
federal statutory law).
97. See, e.g., Havenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880) (treaties are superior
to state law including state constitutions); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559
(1832) (supremacy clause of the United States Constitution applies to Indian treaties).
98. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189 (treaty with Chippewa);
Act of Mar. 2, 1889 ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 (treaty with Sioux); Act of Feb. 19, 1867, arts.
III, IV, 15 Stat. 505 (treaty with Santee Sioux).
99. However, engaging in some commercial enterprise with the tribe or otherwise oc-
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ments for the existence of other tribal powers and these have not
been successful. 00 This argument has not been accepted because
by enacting legislation that allowed and even encouraged non-
Indians to settle upon reservation lands,' 0 ' Congress effectively
repealed many treaties insofar as the Indians' right to exclusive
use is concerned.0 2 Hence, as Indian lands became non-Indian
lands through the transfer of ownership, tribal powers based
upon a treaty right of exclusive use disappeared.0 3
Congressional Delegation
The Supreme Court has upheld congressional delegation of
governmental power to Indian tribes.' 0 4 While Congress may be
able to vest tribal courts with the authority to hear collection
cases involving nonmembers as well as members, it has not
specifically done so.' Furthermore, the Indian Reorganization
cupying tribal property may bring one under tribal court authority as to that particular
commercial activity or property. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
100. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195 n.6 (tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
101. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for examples of legislative acts permit-
ting non-Indians to acquire land within boundaries of tribal reservations.
102. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (to the extent that an earlier treaty con-
flicts with an act of Congress, the statute renders the treaty null).
103. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (when reservation lands were
transferred to nonmembers the absolute and undisturbed use provided by treaty no longer
extended to this property and, therefore, the tribe had no treaty authority to regulate
hunting and fishing by nonmembers on nonmember-owned land); Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup Tribe lost exclusive treaty right
to fish in reservation waters when both tribe and United States transferred land in fee
simple to non-Indians).
104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1982) (exempts from federal criminal laws the on-
reservation sale of alcoholic beverages in accordance with tribal ordinances). The effect of
this statute has been to license tribal governments with the authority to control all reserva-
tion liquor sales, both Indian and non-Indian. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544
(1975) (upholding federal criminal prosecution of non-Indian in violation of 11 U.S.C. §
1161). Of course, in granting regulatory authority to tribal courts, Congress could not
give away or otherwise impinge upon the constitutional rights of non-Indians. See Reid,
354 U.S. at I (Congress may not, by treaty or statute, give away the fundamental rights
of United States citizens).
105. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has established Courts of Indian Offenses for
those tribes that have not adopted their own law and order code. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.1 to
11.37 (1984). These courts are given jurisdiction over all civil suits in which the defendant
is a member of the tribe, and in all other actions if the parties stipulate to jurisdiction. 25
C.F.R. §§ 11.22 to I1.22C (1984). Courts of Indian Offenses are not functioning on
North Dakota reservations because each tribe has enacted its own tribal code and
established a tribal court system. However, Courts of Indian Offenses and tribal courts
are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to have both a tribal court and a federal Court of




Act of 1934 has already been considered and rejected by the
Supreme Court as a general source of tribal jurisdiction over both
members and nonmembers.' 0 6
Tribal Sovereignty
Inherent tribal sovereignty is the theory that Indian tribes re-
tain a fundamental governmental power over everything and
everyone within their reservations. Supporters of Indian
sovereignty assert that since tribes were once free and indepen-
dent nations, they still retain all vestiges of governmental power
that have not been expressly taken from them by treaty or act of
Congress.'0 7 Advocates of complete tribal sovereignty claim that
unless specifically denied by treaty or federal law, Indian tribes
retain the full range of governmental powers including the
authority to raise revenue by taxation and licensing of business,
property, and persons; the power to condemn or take property by
eminent domain; the right to regulate health, safety, and com-
mercial activities; and all other powers of government, be they
legislative, executive, or judicial.
Tribal sovereignty is not a recent concept. It was argued by
proponents of Indian rights throughout the nineteenth century and
received both judicial recognition and recognized limitations. 0'1
Yet it has only been in recent years that the full impact of tribal
sovereignty claims have been felt. 0 9 Often wrapped in the trappings
of government provided by the Wheeler-Howard Act," 0 and with
federal funding available for a variety of governmental func-
tions,' Indian tribes began to actively assert and establish their
106. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
107. See, e.g., U.S. CONG., supra note 96, at 101 (setting forth basic doctrine that
tribes continue to hold all governmental powers not expressly taken from them).
108. See, e.g., Talton v. Mays, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (upholding the right of the
Cherokee Tribe to execute a member for a violation of tribal law); In re Mayfield, 141
U.S. 107 (1891) (denying Cherokee criminal jurisdiction over nonmember charged with
violation of tribal law).
109. See Martone, American Indian Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent
Right of Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME L. 600 (1976).
110. Currently codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-491 (1982).
111. Tribal governments are eligible to receive financial and technical assistance
through a variety of federal programs. E.g., Indian Self-Determination & Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-59 (1982); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1451 to 1543 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Prevention & Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251 to 1376 (1982); Crime Control Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 to 3797
(1982). Of course, recent federal budget cuts and other federal funding problems have
significantly affected tribal governments, which are so heavily dependent upon federal
moneys. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECON., REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 89-98 (1984).
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sovereign rights during the 1970s. This increase in claims of civil
rights has been termed a "new civil war.""' 2
Tribal governments have retained or residual governmental
powers that federal and state courts readily acknowledge." 3 The
full scope of this authority, however, has never been judicially
determined, nor has there been much guidance from the federal
courts in clearly defining the limits of tribal power. Instead, the
tribal right to govern is being determined power by power and
case by case according to the analytical framework established by
four recent United States Supreme Court decisions. Thus a tribal
court's authority to hear and decide collection suits involving In-
dians and non-Indians will exist, if at all, on the basis of the legal
principles articulated in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,""
United States v. Wheeler,"5 Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville,"I6 and Montana v. United States."
Oliphant concerned the power of a tribal government to enact
a criminal code and enforce its law against non-Indians. The non-
Indian defendants in Oliphant were accused of assaulting tribal
police officers, injuring tribal property, and other violations of
the Suquamish Tribal Law and Order Code." '8 The incidents
leading to the arrests and charges occurred on the Port Madison
Reservation in western Washington." 9 Non-Indians living on the
Port Madison Reservation were not entitled to vote in tribal elec-
tions; they had no voice in the passage of the tribal law and order
code; they could not hold tribal office including law enforcement;
and nonmembers were prohibited from serving on tribal juries.
The non-Indian defendants applied to the federal court for a
112. See Martone, supra note 109, at 600. It is a challenge by American Indian tribes
to the governmental structures of both the states and the United States, and the federal
courts are the principal battlegrounds. Id.
113. A tribe may regulate the activities of nonmembers through taxation, licensing, or
other means when the nonmembers enter into a consensual relationship with the tribe or
its members in the course of commercial dealings, contracts, or leases. Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). Tribal governments likewise have the retained sovereign power
to punish tribal offenders, determine tribal membership, and prescribe rules of in-
heritance for members of the tribe. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 n.18. See also supra note 5
and accompanying text for overview of tribal governmental powers.
114. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
115. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
116. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
117. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
118. 435 U.S. at 191.




writ of habeas corpus, but the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington ruled in favor of the tribe."' The
defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed.' 2' The court of appeals upheld the lower court's
decision because it believed that the Suquamish tribal government
had the inherent power to enact a law and order code and to try
non-Indians and punish them for offenses under that code.' 2
The Supreme Court reversed both the trial and appellate courts.
The Supreme Court reasoned that tribal sovereign powers in-
cluded only those powers not expressly limited by specific treaty
provisions and acts of Congress, or otherwise inconsistent with
the status of Indians as dependent people:
[F]rom the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great
solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States
from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty. The
power of the United States to try and criminally punish is an
important manifestation of the power to restrict personal lib-
erty. By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily gave up their power
to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a man-
ner acceptable to Congress.
2 3
Stated otherwise, not only can tribal sovereign powers be taken
away by treaty or act of Congress, but tribal authority over non-
members can also be lost by implication if the claimed govern-
mental power is inconsistent with the status of Indians as a
dependent people.
Finally, the Supreme Court quickly dismissed the Suquamish
Tribe's contention that it could try non-Indians according to In-
dian law and in derogation of basic criminal due process rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Oliphant held that
insofar as non-Indian criminal defendants are concerned, there
are only state and federal laws to be complied with:
Indians are within the geographical limits of the United States.
The soil and people within these limits are under the political
120. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 191
(1978).
121. Id. at 1007.
122. Id.
123. 435 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
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control of the Government of the United States, or the States
of the Union. There exists, in the broad domain of sovereignty
but these two. There may be cities, counties and other organ-
ized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they ... exist
in subordination to one or the other of these.2 '
The second major Indian sovereignty case was United States v.
Wheeler,' 3 and it too involved a question of tribal criminal
jurisdiction. The issue in Wheeler was the origin of a tribe's
power to try and punish its own members for violation of tribal
law. Was this a retained sovereign power or one given to the
tribal government by Congress?
Wheeler, a member of the Navajo Tribe, pled guilty in tribal
court to a misdemeanor violation of the tribal criminal code, but
was thereafter indicted by a federal grand jury on a felony charge
arising out of the same incident.' 26 The federal trial judge rea-
soned that since the tribal court was merely an arm of the federal
government, the subsequent federal prosecution was barred by
the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.
27
The federal district court therefore dismissed the indictment.' 2
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's dismissal,' 29 but the Supreme Court reversed because in
punishing its members a tribe acts as an independent sovereign
and not as an extension of the federal government. '3" More im-
portant than the holding in Wheeler was the Court's analysis in
arriving at a decision respecting double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court first scrutinized federal law in an attempt
to ascertain whether tribal jurisdiction over members was granted
by act of Congress and concluded that federal law did not create
the Indians' power to govern themselves.' Rather, the Wheeler
Court determined that the ultimate source for tribal governmen-
tal powers over members was retained sovereignty.'3 2 When
nonmembers are concerned, though, the Court was careful to em-
phasize that Indian tribes have lost many of their sovereign at-
tributes:
124. Id. at 211 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (emphasis
added)).
125. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
126. See 435 U.S. at 315.
127. See United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977).
128. Id. at 1258.
129. Id.
130. 435 U.S. at 323-28.
131. Id. at 327-29.




The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty
has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations
between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status
of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily
inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine
their external relations. But the powers of self-government, in-
cluding the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal
laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations
among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as
would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent
status.' 33
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville'34 was decided
two years after Wheeler, and it addressed a multitude of state and
tribal jurisdictional issues. Colville was a consolidated case in
which several Indian tribes and the state of Washington were
claiming the right to impose their respective taxes on cigarette
sales by reservation tobacco outlets known as "smoke shops.",35
Washington had an excise tax on cigarettes as well as a retail
sales tax.'3 6 Both taxes purported to cover certain reservation
cigarette sales. 37 The state retail sales tax was not imposed upon
purchases by tribal members,' 38 but it did apply to nonmember
cigarette buyers.139 The excise tax was enforced through stamps
affixed to packages of cigarettes and with one exception, dealers
were required to sell only stamped cigarettes.' 0 The one excep-
tion related to Indians.'"
133. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
134. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
135. See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Res. v. State of Washington, 446 F.
Supp. 1339, 1344-45 (E.D. Wash. 1978). Secondary issues in Colville were the state's
authority to tax Indian vehicles and Washington's assumption of criminal and civil
jurisdiction over the Colville, Lummi, and Makah reservations. See id. at 162-64. The
court held that Washington could not tax on-reservation vehicle use and that the state's
assumption of jurisdiction was legal. Id.
136. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.020 (1976) ($1.60 per carton excise tax on the
"sale, use, consumption, handling, possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the
state of Washington); WASH. REv. CODE § 82.08.020 (1976) (taxing the sale of personal
property, including cigarettes).
137. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 141-42.
.138. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-192 (1977).
139. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 142 n.8.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.030 (1976).
141. Washington initially argued that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales, regardless
of whether the purchaser was Indian or non-Indian. The state based this argument on the
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Washington law permitted Indian tribes to possess unstamped
cigarettes for resale to tribal members. 42 When sales were to non-
Indians or Indians who were not members of the tribe, state law
required reservation tobacco dealers to sell the stamped and
therefore taxed cigarettes.' 3 To prevent fraudulent sales and ex-
cise tax avoidance, Washington law required reservation tobacco
shop operators to keep detailed records of all cigarette sales, both
taxable and nontaxable. '44 The operators had to record and main-
tain for state inspection the number and dollar volume of all sales
to nonmembers.'15 For sales to tribal members, not only did
records have to be kept of the names of exempt purchasers, tribal
affiliation, date, time, place, and amount of each purchase, but
unless actually known to the dealer, the Indian purchaser had to
present a tribal identification card.
46
The tribes also imposed their own tax on all cigarette sales, 
4 7
and these tax revenues were important. Had the Washington
retail and excise taxes been imposed in addition to the tribal tax,
reservation outlets would no longer have been able to underprice
cigarettes offered by off-reservation merchants.148 Since the ma-
jority of on-reservation sales were to non-Indians, losing this
price advantage would seriously impair the ability of reservation
smoke shops to continue in business. 49
To preserve an important source of revenue, the Confederated
Tribes refused to collect the state taxes.' In order to force the
Indians to comply with its laws, Washington seized unstamped
cigarettes bound for the reservation.' The Colville tribes
responded with a lawsuit, challenging not only the lawfulness of
theory that it had assumed general on-reservation taxing authority pursuant to Public
Law 83-280. This theory was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court in Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). Thereafter, Washington abandoned any claim of
authority to tax sales to members. See Confederated Tribes of Colville, 446 F. Supp. at
1346 n.4.
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.260 (1976).
143. See Confederated Tribes of Colville, 446 F. Supp. at 1346; WASH. REV. CODE §
82.24.260 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-192 (1977).
144. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 159.
145. Id.
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.260 (1976); id. § 458-20-192 (1977).
147. See Confederated Tribes of Colville, 446 F. Supp. at 1347.
148. Id.
149. 447 U.S. at 144-45.
150. See Confederated Tribes of Cohille, 446 F. Supp. at 1339-47.




the seizures but also the legality of all taxes imposed by the
state.'52
The tribes were not successful in their attempt to oust state tax-
ation. Washington did have the authority to tax the sale of
cigarettes to nonmembers, to seize contraband (unstamped
cigarettes), and to require smoke shop operators to keep detailed
records of cigarette purchases.' The state also had the right to
tax Indians who purchased cigarettes from reservation tobacco
outlets if they were not tribal members. In the Court's opinion,
nonmember Indians had the same legal status as non-Indians in
general. 
5 4
Although the Colville Indians were not able to prevent the state
of Washington from taxing sales to nonmembers, the tribes
themselves still enjoyed taxing authority over all reservation sales,
including those to nonmembers. The Colville Court reasoned that
the sovereign power to tax nonmembers had not been lost
through implication because there was no "overriding federal in-
terest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation."'
5
In Montana v. United States, decided several years after Col-
ville, the issue was the extent of tribal civil regulatory power over
non-Indians on non-Indian lands.'" The Crow Tribe of Montana
had enacted an ordinance (Tribal Resolution 74-05) that pro-
hibited hunting and fishing within the reservation by anyone who
was not a member.'" The Crow contended that this law even ap-
plied to non-Indians hunting and fishing upon non-Indian-owned
lands.' Montana claimed the right to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-Indians upon non-Indian-owned lands located
within reservation boundaries, and the United States brought suit
on behalf of the Crow Indians, challenging the state's regulatory
authority. 5 9
152. Colville, 447 U.S. at 138-39.
153. Id. at 134.
154. Id. at 161.
155. Id. at 154.
156. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The Crow Tribe was also claiming title to the bed of the Big
Horn River, but the Court held that title passed to the state of Montana upon its admis-
sion into the Union. Montana, 450 U.S. 556-57.
157. Id. at 549.
158. Id. at 557-63.
159. See United States v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont. 1978). The United
States sued in its own right and as a fiduciary for the Crow Tribe. Id. The district court
essentially ruled in favor of the state by recognizing Montana's exclusive right to regulate
on-reservation hunting by nonmembers. Id. at 611. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed in part the decision of the lower court, holding that the Crow Tribe had a con-
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Dealing first with the assertion that the exclusive use of original
reserved lands granted by treaty to the Crow Tribe was also an
implicit grant of regulatory power over non-Indian lands, the
Court concluded that if the 1868 treaty was a source of tribal
power, that power could not be applied to lands owned in fee
simple by non-Indians.16 0 The Crow no longer possessed a treaty
right to regulate these alienated lands because they no longer en-
joyed the exclusive use, occupation, and control of them.16'
Turning next to sovereignty as a source of the tribe's
regulatory power, the Court declared:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign powers to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the ac-
tivities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases or other arrangements .... A tribe may also re-
tain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political in-
tegrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.1
62
The Court concluded, however, that the state of Montana could
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians upon non-Indian-
owned lands, but that the Crow Tribe could not. 63 The Crow
Tribe could not regulate nonmember hunting and fishing
because, under the facts in the case, there was no showing that
these non-Indian activities either threatened or otherwise had a
direct effect on tribal political integrity, economic security,
health, or welfare. 64
What then can be gleaned from Oliphant, Wheeler, Colville,
and Montana regarding the general sovereign powers remaining
to tribal governments? First, it is obvious from Wheeler and Col-
ville that tribal governments have the broadest of sovereign
powers over their members, property belonging to tribal
current right to regulate nonmember hunters and fishermen. See United States v. Mon-
tana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979).
160. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 557-61.
161. Id. at 557-63.
162. Id. at 565-67 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 557-61.




members, and commercial activities involving nonmembers and
either the tribe or tribal members. Members are subject to tribal
authority because of their status and the unique nature of Indian
governments.' 65  Nonmembers typically become subject to a
tribe's regulatory authority by some on-reservation commercial
involvement with the tribe. If nonmembers are going to do
business with the Indians, they will do business according to the
rules and regulations established by the tribe.'
66
Montana indicates that even in the absence of a direct contact
with tribal members, tribal sovereign powers may exist over both
nonmembers and nonmember-owned property if the Indian
government can show the necessary nexus between the regulatory
authority sought and a vital tribal interest. Whether there exists
the requisite "effect" upon tribal integrity, economic security, or
welfare to create the sovereign right to regulate nonmembers is an
issue of fact, and the tribe has the burden of proof on this
issue. 67 Tribal governmental authority over nonmembers will, in
short, be decided on the facts existing each time a particular
power is claimed. Therefore, a judicial determination that a tribal
government possesses regulatory authority over nonmembers in
one instance may have no significance respecting subsequent ef-
forts to exercise the same authority over other nonmembers, or to
efforts by yet other tribal governments to exercise similar
powers. 6 
165. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
166. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 152-53.
167. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
168. Consider for example, Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d
at 901, recognizing a tribal government's authority to zone and regulate non-Indian land
use within the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming. The Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes
were able to apply their land-use law to non-Indian developers because the federal court
found the necessary connection with a valid tribal interest: "conduct which threatened or
had some direct effect on the political integrity, economic security or health and welfare
of the tribe." Id. at 903.
The non-Indian land development consisted of several subdivisions vithin an area
where tribal ceremonies were held annually, and they were reasonably close to Indian
cemeteries, an Indian activity hall, and predominantly Indian schools. A federal judge
found that the tribes had a "significant and substantial interest in the area" because of
the Indian activities and this was sufficient to create tribal civil jurisdiction over this par-
ticular non-Indian land. Id. (emphasis added).
The Knight court did not hold that the Crow could regulate all non-Indian land lying
within the reservation nor could the tribe do so without first showing the tribal interest
necessary to create regulatory authority over non-Indian lands. Thus, efforts by the
Arapahoe and Shoshone tribes to regulate non-Indian land use elsewhere on the Wind
River Reservation would not be sustained without a strong showing of a necessity to
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Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Debtor-Creditor Cases
Using the principles of law established in Oliphant, Wheeler,
Colville, and Montana, it is possible to analyze the subject matter
jurisdiction of the various North Dakota tribal courts over collec-
tion suits. This analysis will be undertaken for each potential
combination of Indian and non-Indian litigants.' 9
Indian Creditor and Indian Debtor
Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing governmental
power over both their members and their territory."' Subject
only to the limitations contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968," ' tribal governments have broad authority over tribal
members."12 All of the North Dakota tribal courts claim jurisdic-
tion over actions involving members,'" and they clearly have the
authority to hear collection suits when all the litigants belong to
the tribe.'7 4 Moreover, if the cause of action (debt) arose on the
reservation or the collateral is located -within the reservation
boundaries, North Dakota state courts cannot hear the case."'7
regulate in order to protect traditional Indian activities and culture. Similar proof and
findings would be required in each instance where a tribal court claimed subject matter
jurisdiction over nonmember litigants.
169. As used in this analysis, the term "Indian" refers to members of that particular
tribe. Indians who happen to be before a tribal court but who are in fact members of
another tribe should be treated as non-Indians for jurisdictional purposes. See supra note
154 and accompanying text.
170. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
171. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
172. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 49 (tribal membership and right of inheritance);
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313 (general criminal jurisdiction); Talton v. Mays, 163 U.S. at 376
(death penalty). See also F. COHEN, supra note 96, at 342. See generally 55 Int. Dec. 14
(1934) (powers of Indian tribes). However, Indians who are not members of the tribe are
treated the same as non-Indians for jurisdictional purposes. See Confederated Tribes of
Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61 (treating nonmember Indians as non-Indians for purpose of
state taxation).
173. See supra notes 58, 66, 72, 80, 91.
174. See F. COHEN, supra note 96, at 342. Cf. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382
(1976) (adoption proceeding); Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012
(1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960) (divorce action).
175. When the debtor is a tribal member and the debt arose on the reservation, a col-
lection suit cannot be brought in state court. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1966). Likewise, if the collateral is personal property located on the reservation,
state courts are without the authority to compel its return. Cf. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort
Belknap, 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont- 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 979 (9th
Cir. 1983) (because tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/2
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Indian Creditor and Non-Indian Debtor
Both the Fort Berthold and Fort Totten tribal codes provide
for or claim subject matter jurisdiction over collection suits be-
tween members and non-Indian debtors.' The Sisseton-
Wahpeton and Turtle Mountain courts will apparently hear these
kinds of collection cases with the consent of the nonmember
defendant," 7 but the Standing Rock Tribal Code precludes ac-
tions against non-Indians. "'
Assuming the debt was incurred on the reservation and tribal
law does not otherwise prohibit suits against nonmembers, there
would seemingly exist sufficient tribal interest to justify a tribal
court's authority to hear the case. 79 If the debt was incurred off
the reservation and the non-Indian debtor objects to the exercise
of tribal court jurisdiction, then the Indian court will probably be
without the right to try the matter.8 0 Yet, even if the tribal court
for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property in-
terests of both Indian and non-Indians, federal court was without jurisdiction to order
return of non-Indian property seized by order of the tribal court). But ef. National
Farmers Union Ins., 105 S. Ct. 2447 (recognizing federal court jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) to review acts in excess of tribal authority). If land is pledged as
security for the debt, and this is Indian-owned and lying within a reservation's boun-
daries, North Dakota courts have no jurisdiction over the property. See Act of Feb. 22,
1889, 25 Stat. 676 (enabling act requiring North Dakota to disclaim title to Indian lands);
N.D. CoNsr. art. III, § 1(2) (disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian lands).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 66, 72.
177. See supra notes 72, 91 and accompanying text. The voluntary relinquishment of
jurisdiction over non-Indians is binding upon the tribal court. See Three Affiliated Tribes
v. Wold Eng'g, 104 S. Ct. at 2271. But see R.J. Williams Co., 509 F. Supp. at 933, rev'd
on other grounds, 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983) (although the tribal court may have lacked
civil jurisdiction to seize non-Indian property with a tribal court writ, federal courts had
no power to prevent the attachment). The Supreme Court's recognition of federal court
jurisdiction to review action in excess of tribal authority in the National Farmers Union
Ins. case, raises some doubt about the validity of the R.J. Williams Co. decision.
178. See supra text accompanying note 80.
179. See Babbit Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1707 (1984) (upholding Navajo Tribal Court's jurisdiction over non-
Indian automobile dealers attempting to repossess collateral located within reservations
boundaries). Cf. Cardin, 671 F.2d at 363 (recognizing tribal right to enforce health and
safety code against non-Indian business); Knight, 670 F.2d at 900 (enforcing tribal zoning
law against non-Indian developers).
180. Cf., Swift Transp., Inc. v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982), vacated as
moot, 574 F. Supp. 710 (D. Ariz. 1983) (tribal court had no jurisdiction to hear personal
injury case against a non-Indian when accident occurred on non-Indian-owned land
located within reservation boundaries). But cf. National Farmers Union Ins., 105 S. Ct.
at 2447 (seemingly indicating that under the right factual circumstances tribal courts may
have jurisdiction over such cases).
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had subject matter jurisdiction over a non-Indian debtor, the
court has little power to enforce its decision beyond the reserva-
tion boundaries.'S'
Non-Indian Creditor and Indian Debtor
North Dakota tribal courts are unanimous in asserting the
authority to try cases brought by a non-Indian creditor against a
tribal member.' 8 2 The Standing Rock Tribal Code restricts its
tribal court to actions involving $300 or less and further requires
that the non-Indian plaintiff either be a resident of or doing
business on the reservation.' 3
Collection suits against tribal members certainly meet the Mon-
tana sufficient and substantial tribal interest test for exercise of
jurisdiction." ' Not only has the use of tribal courts in such cases
181. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc. 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977) (Arizona courts were not required to give full faith and credit to Navajo tribal
resolution under either 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) or U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1. But see Jim
v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (holding that laws of the
Navajo Indian Tribe are entitled by federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to full faith and credit
in New Mexico state courts). North Dakota apparently would not give full faith and
credit to a tribal court judgment. Cf. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d at 144 (concluding that the
Turtle Mountain Tribal Court would not give full faith and credit to child custody
modification order from a North Dakota district court).
Even though the debt arose on the reservation, an Indian creditor may still sue a non-
Indian debtor in state court. See Wold Eng'g., 106 S. Ct. at 2305. Moreover, if the re-
quisite jurisdiction exists, the tribal member may also be able to sue in a federal forum.
See, e.g., Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974) (federal diversity jurisdiction
existed in case involving only Indian litigants). The tribe always has the right to proceed
in federal court when the controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 66, 72, 80, 91.
183. See supra note 80. The Standing Rock Tribal Code seems to create a jurisdic-
tional void. The tribal court cannot hear collection suits involving more than S300 dollars.
State courts have no jurisdiction if the debt arose on the reservation or involves collateral
located within the reservation boundaries. Many non-Indian creditors will, therefore, be
left without a forum in which to collect debts of more than $300 when the requisities for
federal court jurisdiction are not present. Cf. R.J. Williams Co., 509 F. Supp. at 933
(discussing similar jurisdictional void on Crow Reservation in Montana).
184. See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text. Montana did not use the "suffi-
cientand substantial interest" language in discussing the test for a tribe's civil regulatory
authority over non-Indians and their property. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67 (a tribe
retains civil regulatory authority over non-Indians or non-Indian-owned land when the
non-Indian conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe"). The "significant and substan-
tial interest" standard was developed by lower federal courts applying the Montana test.
See Knight, 670 F.2d at 903.
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received the highest judicial approval,'85 but there is no other
forum in which the non-Indian creditor can have the matter
tried. a
8
Non-Indian Creditor and Non-Indian Debtor
Notwithstanding their claims to the contrary, it is not likely
that tribal courts possess nonconsensual jurisdiction over civil
suits involving only nonmembers. Tribal courts are unable to ob-
tain jurisdiction in cases involving only non-Indians because of
the difficulty in establishing the direct effect on Indians or their
property, which is the prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction
established by Montana.'87
Even though tribal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over
nonmember collection suits, they may still play a significant role
in non-Indian debt collection practices. The North Dakota tribes,
for example, prohibit self-help repossession, which requires a
creditor to seek the aid of the tribal court in seizing collateral.' 88
These laws are enforced irrespective of the nonmember status of
the parties, and jurisdiction exists because of a vital tribal interest
in avoiding breaches of the peace that might result from a
creditor's self-help repossession.' 9
III. Survey of North Dakota Attorneys
Format of Survey
Part of the research methodology for this project consisted of
surveying attorneys about. their experiences with and opinions
concerning the use of tribal courts for collecting business debts.
185. E.g., Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 423; Williams, 358 U.S. at 217; Hot Oil Serv., Inc.,
366 F.2d at 295.
186. See supra note 174. Tribal courts have a monopoly on jurisdiction in these types
of cases because reservation Indians have the right to make their own laws and be gov-
erned by them. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217.
187. See supra note 168 and text. See also F. COHEN, supra note 96, at 343.
188. Either by tribal code or tribal common law, all North Dakota tribes prohibit self-
help repossession. If the debtor surrenders the collateral, tribal law will not bar non-
judicial repossession, but absent this voluntary relinquishment a creditor has no right to
take the collateral without a tribal court order. Nevertheless, a secured creditor can obtain
immediate delivery of collateral on the Turtle Mountain Reservation without a court
order if he brings a replevin action and posts security in an amount equal to twice the
value of the personal property pledged. See TURTLE MOUNTAIN TRIBAL CODE ch. 4.03
(1976).
189. E.g., Babbit Ford, Inc., 710 F.2d at 587 (upholding tribal proscription of self-
help repossession against non-Indian automobile dealer).
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This survey was accomplished with a written questionnaire, which
was mailed to licensed North Dakota lawyers having offices on or
within 50 miles of a reservation. The 50-mile radius was selected
because these are the attorneys most likely to have experience
with a North Dakota tribal court. These lawyers are more likely
to have tribal court experience because it is cost-prohibitive in
most instances for creditors to employ legal counsel and have
them travel great distances to attend a court session. Nor would
businesses many miles from a reservation be likely to resort to an
Indian court system on collection matters.
Questionnaires were sent to 372 lawyers and 186 (50%)
responded by answering some or all of the relevant inquiries. The
respondents were permitted to remain anonymous in an attempt
to obtain candid answers to sensitive questions, but the question-
naires were color coded so that those returned could be correlated
with a particular tribal court. Table 2 shows the distribution by
reservation of attorneys contacted and the number who re-
sponded.
Table 2
Number of Attorney Respondents
for Each Reservation
Number of
Reservation Total Attorneys Contacted Respondents*
Fort Berthold 26 11
Fort Totten 34 16
Sisseton-Wahpeton 19 9
Standing Rock 284 145
Turtle Mountain 9 5
* Summary questionnaires encapsulating basic data obtained are shown in Appendices
A through F. Information derived from an analysis of the surveys is set forth in the body
of this report.
The questionnaire contained eight questions, some with sub-
parts, and it was designed to obtain information in four areas.
Questions one through four provided the following data: (1) the
volume of collection suits brought by the surveyed North Dakota
attorneys during 1984; (2) how frequently they appeared for a




represented in these cases; (4) the total number of attorney-
involved collection suits in the various tribal courts that year.
Question five, consisting of six subparts, was posed to all
lawyers who had appeared in tribal court on collection cases.
Those with tribal court experience were asked: (1) their opinion
respecting the competence of the tribal court judge and tribal
court personnel; (2) whether they believed the tribal court system
was fair to both Indian and non-Indian; (3) if the tribal court
rules and procedures were similar to those of North Dakota state
courts; (4) how they felt about appearing in tribal court; (5) if the
results in their particular cases were comparable to what would
have been achieved had suit been brought in the state court
system; (6) whether they would recommend tribal court to a non-
Indian creditor.
Attorneys with no experience in tribal court collection actions
were requested to answer question six. There were three subparts
to this question that focused upon the attitudes of these attorneys
regarding use of an Indian court system for collecting business
debts. Attorneys responding to this question were asked: (1)
whether they believed a non-Indian creditor would be fairly
treated in tribal court when the debtor is an Indian; (2) if they ex-
pected the tribal court rules and procedures to be substantially
different from those used in the state courts; (3) would they
recommend tribal court to a non-Indian creditor when the debtor
is a member of the tribe.
The opinions held on these questions could be important for a
variety of reasons. If a significant number of attorneys believed
that tribal courts operated under rules and procedures with which
they had little familiarity, they would not be inclined to bring col-
lection actions in the Indian court system. When attorneys are of
the opinion that tribal courts are unfair or otherwise unjust, they
might transmit to their business clients the same attitudes and
prejudices. If the client holds the tribal court system in low
esteem, he is not likely to resort to Indian courts on collection
matters, nor will credit b e as freely extended when tribal court is
the creditor's only recourse in the event of default.
Questions seven and eight asked whether each attorney
surveyed would be interested in learning about tribal court prac-
tice and procedure, either through a seminar or a law review issue
devoted to these subjects. These questions were a supplement to
question six. The purpose of questions seven and eight was to
determine if and how it might be possible to educate lawyers on
the Indian court system. Educating practicing attorneys about
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tribal court procedure seemed the best way to alleviate their ap-
prehensions, if any, about using these courts to collect business
debts.
Comprehensive Summary
The overall results from this survey indicated that responding
attorneys had been involved in 1,950 collection suits in 1984,190
and that 92 of the cases (4.7%) were in a tribal court. In 1,695
(86.9%) actions attorneys appeared on behalf of creditors,' but
of these only ninety-three creditor-clients (4.7%) were Indians.
Twenty-five lawyers (13.4%) were experienced in tribal court
collection actions, and their responses were generally favorable to
the Indian court system as a whole. Fifteen (60%) felt tribal
judges and court personnel were competent, and thirteen (52%)
believed tribal courts were fair to both non-Indian and Indian
alike. Thirteen attorneys (54.2%) stated that tribal court rules
and procedures were not similar to those used in state court, but
a majority (68%) of these attorneys were still comfortable prac-
ticing in Indian courts. Slightly more than half the lawyers (54%)
with tribal court experience believed that a different result would
have been attained had their case been tried in state court, and
they would not recommend tribal court to non-Indian creditors.
The attorneys without tribal court experience were not as
favorably disposed toward the tribal court system. Fifty-five of
these respondents (43%) did not believe a non-Indian creditor
would be fairly treated when the debtor is a tribal member. Only
nineteen (14.8%) would advise a non-Indian creditor to use tribal
court when state court is available as an alternative forum. Sixty
(46.9%) expected the tribal court rules and procedures to differ
markedly from those used in state court.
There were 164 and 151 responses to questions seven and eight,
respectively. Ninety-two attorneys (61%) favored law review
treatment of tribal court rules, procedures, and jurisdiction, but a
majority of respondents were against the seminar.
Data from these questionnaires were separately compiled for
190. See infra Appendix A for comprehensive results of the survey. The author wishes
to emphasize that not all respondents answered every question that pertained to him or
her. Thus, the data presented for each question relates only to the attorneys who respond-
ed to that question.
191. It is possible to attribute the obvious underrepresentation of debtors to a lack of
funds. If the debtor is not financially capable of paying the underlying obligation, then he




each reservation. These results, however, did not vary signifi-
cantly from those stated above. A summary of the data from this
survey is provided in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of Attorneys' Survey
Number of Collection Suits 1,950
Creditor Cases 1,695
Tribal Court Cases 92
Indian Clients Represented 93
Number of Responding Attorneys 186
Counsel With Tribal Court Experience 25
Attorneys With Tribal Court Experience Who Would
Recommend that Court System to a Non-Indian
Creditor 11
Attorneys Without Experience in a Tribal Court Who
Believed that a Non-Indian Creditor Would Be
Fairly Treated in the Indian Court System 21
Fort Berthold Summary
Questionnaires were sent to twenty-six attorneys practicing
within or near the Fort Berthold Reservation boundaries, and
eleven (42.3%) were returned. 2 There were 217 collection suits
and in almost 80 percent of the cases attorneys were representing
the creditor. Fourteen collection actions involved Indian clients
and thirty-eight suits (17.5%) were in tribal court.
Five attorneys had appeared before the Fort Berthold Tribal
Court, but only two felt comfortable practicing in that forum.
The answers were evenly divided for the remainder of question
five. Two respondents had favorable experiences with tribal
court, and two did not.
Sixty-six percent of the attorneys who had not been to tribal
court did not believe non-Indians would be fairly treated, nor
would they recommend use of tribal court to a non-Indian
creditor if the matter could be brought in state court. Fort Ber-
thold attorneys generally expected tribal rules of practice and
procedure to be similar to those in use in state courts. Table 4
presents a summary of the Fort Berthold survey data.
192. See infra Appendix B for complete results of the Fort Berthold Survey.
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Table 4
Summary of Fort Berthold Survey
Number of Collection Suits 217
Creditor Cases 154
Tribal Court Cases 38
Indian Clients Represented 14
Number of Responding Attorneys 11
Counsel With Tribal Court Experience 5
Attorneys With Tribal Court Experience Who Would
Recommend that Court System to a Non-Indian
Creditor 2
Attorneys Without Experience in a Tribal Court Who
Believed that a Non-Indian Creditor Would Be
Fairly Treated in the Indian Court System 0
The questionnaire did not seek written comments or other un-
solicited opinions on the tribal court system, and no space was
provided for such personal expressions. Nevertheless, unsolicited
comments were received, and they ran the gamut from those sym-
pathetic to the needs of Indians and the role of tribal courts, to
statements openly hostile toward both Indians and their govern-
ments. There was also a good measure of humor in some com-
ments. The following attorney statements are a representative
sample of those received in the Fort Berthold survey:
"Prior to 1981 I had several opportunities to appear in tribal
courts, both at Fort Totten and at Belcourt [Turtle Mountain
Reservation]. It was my experience that the tribal courts were run
on a very political basis. The results depended in a major part on
who the plaintiff was. Race did not seem to be a major factor in
the judge's decisions. The written rules for the courts are almost
identical to the state's, however, in most instances the rules are
not followed, anyway."
"You must realize that there are four tribal courts in North
Dakota, each is unique and separate from the others."
"Rather than being compared with the white man's district
court, one might better compare tribal court to our city
court .... [W]e select a farmer's son (who has never seen a






Thirty-four attorneys were questioned in the Fort Totten por-
tion of this research project and sixteen (47.10o) responses were
received.' 93 There were 211 collection cases involving these
lawyers and they represented creditors 87 percent of the time. In-
dians were clients in only ten of the cases (4.7%), and eight ac-
tions (3.8%) were tried in tribal court.
Six attorneys had appeared in tribal court. Two practitioners
were satisfied with their tribal court experience, while the remain-
ing four were not. Forty-four percent of the attorneys with no
practical experience in tribal court expected the rules and pro-
cedures to be similar to state practice. Five respondents (55.6%)
did not believe non-Indians would be fairly treated, and six
(75%) would not recommend tribal court to a non-Indian
creditor. A majority of the Fort Totten lawyers (57.1%) were not
interested in a seminar on tribal court practice, but ten (71.4%)
said they would like to see a law review issue dealing with the sub-
ject. Table 5 summarizes the Fort Totten data.
Table 5
Summary of Fort Totten Survey
Number of Collection Suits 211
Creditor Cases 184
Tribal Court Cases 8
Indian Clients Represented 10
Number of Responding Attorneys 16
Counsel With Tribal Court Experience 6
Attorneys With Tribal Court Experience Who Would
Recommend that Court System to a Non-Indian
Creditor , 2
Attorneys Without Experience in a Tribal Court Who
Believed that a Non-Indian Creditor Would Be
Fairly Treated in the Indian Court System 0
The following are typical of the attorney comments received on
the Fort Totten questionnaire:
"I refuse to appear in tribal court."
193. See infra Appendix C for complete results of Fort Totten survey.
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"I don't feel the tribal court provides justice to the Indian or
non-Indian. Unfortunately, the result would depend more upon
who the people involved are rather than the case."
"Tribal court is not used because of a lack of results."
Sisseton- Wahpeton (Lake Traverse) Summary
Nine of the nineteen attorneys (47.407o) contacted in the
Sisseton-Wahpeton survey returned their questionnaires.' 9 These
members of the North Dakota Bar appeared in seventy-one col-
lection suits in 1984 but represented only two Indians. In 83 per-
cent of these cases the Sisseton-Wahpeton lawyers had the
creditor as a client. No action had been brought in tribal court by
the responding attorneys, and none of these counsel had any ex-
perience with the tribal court system.
The responses were generally noncommittal (i.e., "No Opi-
nion") when it came to using tribal courts in collection suits, and
there was little interest in learning about tribal court practice. In
fact, the only comment on the Sisseton-Wahpeton questionnaire
concerned the inquiry about having a law review treatment of
tribal court practice and procedure and the response was
"Definitely Not!" Table 6 capsulizes the Sisseton-Wahpeton
results.
Table 6
Summary of Sisseton-Wahpeton Survey
Number of Collection Suits 71
Creditor Cases 59
Tribal Court Cases 0
Indian Clients Represented 2
Number of Responding Attorneys 9
Counsel With Tribal Court Experience 0
Attorneys With Tribal Court Experience Who Would
Recommend that Court System to a Non-Indian
Creditor N/A
Attorneys Without Experience in a Tribal Court Who
Believed that a Non-Indian Creditor Would Be
Fairly Treated in the Indian Court System 0
Standing Rock Summary
The Standing Rock sampling area included Bismarck, North




Dakota, which accounts for the greater number of respondents.
A total of 284 attorneys were mailed the questionnaire and 145
(51.1%) were returned.' 95 These attorneys appeared in 1,408 col-
lection suits during 1984. In 1,245 of the cases (88.4%) the at-
torneys represented the creditor, eighteen suits (1 %) were in tribal
court, and sixty-two of their clients (4.4%) were Indian.
Eleven respondents had either brought or defended collection
cases in tribal court. These lawyers were generally evenly divided
in their opinions of tribal court practice, except for the seven at-
torneys (70%) who would not recommend that a non-Indian
creditor use tribal court.
The majority of the attorneys without a history of practice
before tribal court did not believe a non-Indian creditor would be
fairly treated in that forum, nor would they advise a non-Indian
client to use tribal court when suit could be brought in state
court. Approximately 38 percent of those responding were
amenable to seminars on the tribal court system, while 63 percent
were receptive to dealing with the subject in a law review.
Fifty (47.2%) expected tribal practice and procedure to differ
substantially from state court. Thirty (28.3%) did not believe
there would be a significant difference between practicing in
tribal court and state court. Twenty-six (24.5%) had no opinion
on the matter. The data from Standing Rock are shown in Table
7.
Table 7
Summary of Standing Rock Survey
Number of Collection Suits 1,408
Creditor Cases 1,245
Tribal Court Cases 18
Indian Clients Represented 62
Number of Responding Attorneys 145
Counsel with Tribal Court Experience 11
Attorneys With Tribal Court Experience Who Would
Recommend that Court System to a Non-Indian
Creditor 3
Attorneys Without Experience in a Tribal Court Who
Believed that a Non-Indian Creditor Would Be
Fairly Treated in the Indian Court System 20
195. See infra Appendix E for complete results of Standing Rock survey.
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The attorney comments from the Standing Rock survey were
the most vitriolic of all those received. The following opinions
were expressed by attorneys answering the Standing Rock survey:
"My experience with native Americans has not been such that I
can comment favorably. I have been informed that tribal courts
are not comparable, some being biased and some fair to the ex-
treme. Native American debtors in this area have not been easy to
deal with."
"I am sure every white creditor would rather sue in county
court where he or she can take advantage of a jurisdiction which
has been unfair to Indians."
"My experience in the past has left a bad taste for tribal
courts."
"The defendant on the [witness] stand admitted he owed the
debt. The court refused to direct a verdict and the jury returned a
verdict of dismissal."
"Tribal courts face two basic problems: [1] Funding is often
uncertain even if the tribal council wants to provide adequate
funds. [2] [The] Tribal court is not sufficiently removed from
tribal politics."
"I can't get paid after I win in state court either."
"The idea of special sovereign status for native Americans is
not consistent with the Constitution. If a history of persecution
of a minority by the majority ... means sovereignty and special
rights, then we have other such minority blocks in our popula-
tion. I am partly of Irish descent. Their record of discrimination
and persecution extends back 800 years, not 200 or so as in the
case of native Americans."
Turtle Mountain Summary
There were nine attorneys contacted in the Turtle Mountain
segment of this research project and five (55.6%) returned ques-
tionnaires.' 96 These respondents appeared in forty-three collec-
tion suits during the year and represented creditors in forty-two
(97.6%) of the cases. More than half of these actions (65.1%)
were in tribal court, but there were only five (11.6%) Indian
clients.
Four of the answering attorneys had practiced in the tribal
court, and the Turtle Mountain court system received a good
rating. These lawyers believed the court personnel were compe-




tent and were unanimous in recommending tribal court to non-
Indian creditors.
The one lawyer with no tribal court experience expected the
rules of practice and procedure to be markedly different from the
state court standards. This lawyer did not think a non-Indian
creditor would be fairly treated in tribal court, nor would he
recommend the Indian court system to a non-Indian creditor if
state court was an option.
Respecting the education questions, the law review article was
favored over attending a seminar. There was only one attorney
interested in the seminar. Table 8 summarizes the Turtle Moun-
tain data.
One written comment was received, and it was directed to a
specific question. The question asked if the respondent would
recommend tribal court to a non-Indian creditor, and the com-
ment was: "What choice do I have?"
Table 8
Turtle Mountain Survey
Number of Collection Suits 43
Creditor Cases 42
Tribal Court Cases 28
Indian Clients Represented 5
Number of Responding Attorneys 5
Counsel With Tribal Court Experience 4
Attorneys With Tribal Court Experience Who Would
Recommend that Court System to a Non-Indian
Creditor 4
Attorneys Without Experience in a Tribal Court Who
Believed that a Non-Indian Creditor Would Be
Fairly Treated in the Indian Court System 0
IV. Personal Interviews
Tribal court personnel and local business owners were inter-
viewed as a part of this research project. These interviews were
either conducted in person or by telephone, and they were in-
tended to obtain information on the actual use of tribal courts by
local merchants, banks, and other financial institutions. A secon-
dary objective of these interviews was to discover the opinions
local business persons held about tribal courts and to consider
No. 11
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what effect, if any, these opinions had upon the extension of
credit to Native Americans.
Tribal Informants
North Dakota tribal courts were contacted and data were
gathered on the number and type of collection suits being
brought. Fort Berthold, Sisseton-Wahpeton, Standing Rock, and
Turtle Mountain data were collected through telephone interviews
with tribal judges, clerks of court, and other court personnel.
Fort Totten was visited and the information was obtained directly
from the tribal judges, the clerk of court, and various Bureau of
Indian Affairs employees. The data acquired from these tribal
sources indicated a much greater use of tribal courts for business
collections than one might have suspected from the results of the
survey of North Dakota attorneys.
There may have been more than 1,300 collection suits brought
in North Dakota tribal courts during 1984.191 Fort Berthold
reported approximately 300 cases. Fort Totten and Standing
Rock each had 80 suits filed. Forty cases were brought at
Sisseton-Wahpeton, and 811 actions were commenced in the Tur-
tle Mountain Tribal Court. Tribal informants were also
unanimous in stating that the majority of these collection actions
were brought by non-Indian creditors against Indian debtors;"'
that attorneys rarely represented either party; and that the
amounts in controversy were usually less than $500. Table 9 com-
pares the litigation data received from the attorneys' survey with
that obtained from tribal informants.
197. The figures on tribal court collection cases were estimates from the persons inter-
viewed. Tribal court records did not categorize civil actions by type of case and race of
litigants.
198. E.g., all cases at Fort Totten were filed by non-Indian creditors. The same was





Comparison of Litigation Data
Reservation Tribal Court Tribal Court Total Number of
Collection Collection Suits Collection Suits
Suits Involving North Involving North
Dakota Attorneys Dakota Attorneys
Fort
Berthold 300 38 217
Fort Totten 80 8 211
Sisseton-
Wah-
peton 40 0 71
Standing
Rock 80 18 1,408
Turtle
Mountain 811 28 43
Business Informants
Collecting information from non-Indian businesses and lending
institutions about the granting of credit to Indians was the most
difficult segment of this research project. The information could
not be acquired with a questionnaire because it is illegal to
discriminate in the granting of credit on the basis of the appli-
cant's national origin, race, religion, color, or age.' 99 Banks, mer-
chants, and other persons who extend credit on a regular basis
would not admit in writing that they refuse credit to Native
Americans because of a distrust of the tribal court system.
It is, however, sometimes possible to obtain candid and forth-
right answers to sensitive questions during a personal interview,
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1591-1691(0 (1982). Known as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
this law requires those extending credit on a regular basis to make it available to all credit-
worthy customers without regard to race, sex, religion, color, age, or national origin. The
Act applies to department stores, banks, savings and loan associations, realtors,
automobile dealers, and even dentists if they regularly extend credit. Violation of the law
exposes one to civil damages (actual and punitive), plus costs and attorney's fees. See 15
U.S.C. § 1691(e) (1982) (there is a S10,000 cap on punitive damages in individual cases,
and in class actions recoverable punitive damages are restricted to the lesser of $500,000
or one percent of the creditor's net worth).
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especially when the interrogator does not use written notes, car-
ries no recording device, and presses for a truthful response. A
face-to-face interview without paper, pencil, or tape recorder was
the method used to acquire data from non-Indian business peo-
ple. Employees of five lending institutions, two car dealers, and
the president of the North Dakota Collectors' Association were
interviewed in this manner."'0
All those interviewed expressed some concern over the ex-
clusive jurisdiction granted tribal courts when the debtor is an In-
dian and the contract either arose within reservation borders or
involved collateral located on the reservation. One lender, in a
community adjacent to a reservation, had no history of making
consumer loans to Indians! The loan officer indicated, however,
that once a history was developed and it became apparent that
resorting to tribal court was going to be a problem in collecting
defaulted loans, this fact would certainly be taken into considera-
tion in deciding future credit extensions to Native Americans.
Another loan officer acknowledged that extending credit to In-
dians was a troublesome problem because of what his institution
perceived as a lack of recourse in the event of default. This finan-
cial officer emphasized that while Native Americans were obtain-
ing loans, the loans were made on the basis of the applicant's per-
sonal character rather than assets or other collateral located
within the reservation boundaries. If the applicant was known
and believed to be trustworthy from a repayment standpoint, the
loan was made, but without this personal knowledge and evalua-
tion of the would-be borrower's character, credit would not be
extended.
Three of the lending officers interviewed openly admitted hav-
ing great reluctance in making loans to Indians living upon a
reservation and stressed that because of the discretion involved it
was always possible to deny a credit request on grounds other
than race. Yet, one informant's employer went further than the
rest by giving the following written instructions to loan officers
on how to treat credit applications from reservation Indians:
[I]f the banker has reason to believe that removal of the col-
lateral to a particular reservation will impair his access in the
event of default, he may be justified either in refusing the
200. Due to the serious legal implications of an unlawful denial of credit under the
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credit request outright or in imposing more stringent terms
such as a larger down payment or shorter terms.
[Wie recommend even more strongly than before that you exer-
cise extreme caution in granting secured credit to Indian ap-
plicants living on reservations. If you are presented with such
an application for secured credit where the collateral will be
physically located on a reservation you should probably treat
the request as a "character loan" i.e. one where your credit
decision is based principally on your evaluation of the appli-
cant's character. In other words, if, in your opinion, there is a
strong and compelling reason to believe that your access to the
collateral might be impaired, you should probably treat such
requests as though they were for unsecured credit and evaluate
the request accordingly.20'
Of the two automobile dealers interviewed, one was evasive
and noncommittal respecting tribal courts and credit sales to
reservation Indians, whereas the other spoke frankly about what
he believed was a very real and serious problem. This merchant
related past difficulties in repossessing cars on the reservation in
support of his decision not to extend credit to Indians, and he in-
sisted that this practice was economically rather than racially
motivated202
201. Emphasis in original. This policy might very well be a violation of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act because the effect clearly is to treat Native Americans differently
from similarly situated non-Indians. It certainly violates the spirit of that Act because in
most cases a creditor is not even permitted to ask about an applicant's race or national
origin. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.5(c)(5), 202.13 (1985) (prohibiting creditors from inquiring
into a credit applicant's race, color, religion, or national origin except in transactions in-
volving purchase of residential real property with a loan to be secured by a lien on that
property). Moreover, this particular bank's lending policy respecting reservation Indians
is very similar to a practice known as "red-lining."
Red-lining is mortgage credit discrimination based on the characteristics of the
neighborhood surrounding the would-be borrower's dwelling. See Town of Springfield v.
McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (D. Vt. 1982). The term originated from the banking
practice of outlining barrios, ghettos, or economically depressed areas in red ink on a city
map. These neighborhoods were red-lined because the persons living there were thought
to constitute a significant risk to lenders. Consequently, home mortgage applications for
the purchase of property in a red-lined community were summarily denied. Denying credit
because the applicant lives in racially or ethnically segregated neighborhood is discrimina-
tion and a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. See, e.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil
Co., 481 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (plaintiff's allegations that oil company denied
her a credit card because she lived in a predominantly black area of Atlanta was sufficient
to state a cause of action under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
202. To illustrate this point, the informant stated: "Anytime I receive a credit ap-
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Finally, David G. Knudsen, president of the North Dakota
Collectors' Association, was interviewed. Mr. Knudsen seemed
knowledgeable about collection problems associated with the
tribal court system. He felt that it was often easier to collect an
account located in Canada than one from a reservation. It was
also Mr. Knudsen's opinion that the exclusive jurisdiction
granted tribal courts over Indian debtors was a serious problem
for all concerned: "Certainly many millions of dollars in debts




This project was undertaken with limited funds. For that
reason, as well as the difficulty in obtaining information and the
breadth of the subject matter, it does not claim to be a definitive
treatment of tribal courts and their role in the collection of
business debts. Yet the results from this research are certainly
suggestive of real problems for Indians and non-Indians alike.
These problems are rooted both in the exclusive jurisdiction
granted tribal courts over Indian debtors and in the perception of
Indian courts held by non-Indian business owners and their at-
torneys.
plication by someone from West Virginia, I treat it in much the same way as one from a
Native American." The author, being a native of Number 7, West Virginia, fully ap-
preciated this analogy and was not in the least offended. Furthermore, the informant's
analogy to West Virginia is not without validity.
There are, in fact, strong parallels between Native Americans and the inhabitants of the
Southern Highlands. Like the Indians, Southern mountain people have an old and
distinct culture and, ironically, both culture and people are of Indian ancestry. See H.
CAUDELL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS: A BIOGRAPHY OF A DEPRESSED AREA 1-31
(1962). Like many reservations, the Southern Appalachians contain tremendous mineral
resources, primarily owned or controlled by out-of-state corporations, and these holdings
go largely untaxed. See C. GEISLER, WHO OWNS APPALACHIA?: LANDOWNERSHIP AND ITS
IMPACT (1983) (For example, in Lincoln and McDowell counties, West Virginia,
corporate-owned mineral rights are equivalent to 120% and 105016, respectively, of the
total surface area). Yet despite its tremendous mineral wealth, sections of the Southern
Appalachians, like most reservations, remain islands of poverty with inert economies. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF T14E
POPULATION OF WEST VIRGINIA: 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION (1981) (according to 1980
census data, approximately 24% of the residents of Lincoln and McDowell counties in
West Virginia are living below the poverty level). See generally H. CAUDELL, supra
(analyzing both reasons for and extent of Appalachian poverty). For a discussion of com-
parable economic conditions existing on Indian reservations, see PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N
ON INDIAN RESERVATION ECON., supra note I11.




Although those attorneys who have practiced before a tribal
court do not express overwhelming dissatisfaction with the Indian
court system, a majority of all attorneys surveyed had a low opin-
ion of tribal courts. Most, if not all, of these lawyers had no ap-
parent basis for their distrustful attitude about the tribal court
system, but the negative opinion nevertheless exists and it is un-
doubtedly transmitted to banks, savings and loans, and other
business clients these counsel represent. The idea that these pre-
judices are being communicated to non-Indian lending institu-
tions and merchants appears supported by the lack of attorney
participation in tribal court collection suits and the relatively
small amounts in controversy involved in tribal court cases.
Whenever the debt is incurred on the reservation or the col-
lateral is located within the reservation's boundaries, tribal court
is the only forum with authority to hear and decide the case
against an Indian debtor. Indians are indeed being sued in tribal
court for business debts. There are a substantial number of such
actions brought each year in the North Dakota tribal courts. Yet,
these cases are usually brought by non-Indian creditors and they
involve insignificant amounts of money. These are typically small
accounts for which it is cost-prohibitive to employ an attorney to
represent the merchant's or lender's interest.
Tribal courts are obviously functioning like a small claims
court in which creditors appear without counsel because the debt
is so small. Tribal courts are not seeing the large credit cases
because Indians are apparently not being extended large loans or
lines of credit. Indians are not being given the credit they might
otherwise obtain because non-Indian merchants and lenders do
not have confidence in the tribal court system.20 4
How, if ever, the problem will be resolved was not a subject of
this project, nor was there sufficient data collected to suggest a
204. Creditor distrust of the Indian court system and a corresponding lack of finan-
cing for reservation Indians seems to be a problem of national dimension. On January 14,
1983, President Reagan established the Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation
Economies. See Exec. Order 12401, 48 Fed. Reg. 2309 (1983), amended by Exec. Order
12442, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,283 (1983). This Commission was charged with identifying
obstacles to Indian reservation development and to promote the development of a healthy
private sector in reservation economies. Exec. Order 12401, 48 Fed. Reg. 2309 (1983). But
the Commission was specifically instructed by President Reagan not to focus on new
federal financial assistance for Indian governments. Id. at § 2(a). The Commission's
Report and Recommendations to the President of the .United States was submitted on
November 30, 1984. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON INDIAN INDIAN RESERVATION ECON.,
supra note 111.
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comprehensive solution. Whatever the eventual solution, a vital
element will undoubtedly be to educate attorneys and business
Regarding the retarded economies on reservations, the Commission found that tribal
governments themselves were often a hinderance to development. Tribal courts and the
sovereign immunity enjoyed by Indian tribes were singled out for criticism in the Com-
mission's findings on obstacles to economic development:
5. Tribal Political Discrimination
Both Indians and non-Indians complain of political discrimination against them by
tribal governments and by tribal courts which are arms of tribal governments. Access
to tribal physical resources, to the benefits of tribally managed programs, and to tribal
employment is considered to be unfair by many Indians. Decisions rendered by tribal
courts, which are controlled by tribal councils, are also perceived to be unfair by In-
dians and non-Indians.
Businesses see uncertainty in situations where law is subordinate to the whims of
tribal councils, especially where tribal governments are destabilized by frequent
political turnover of elected office holders. There is a fear that tribal courts will not
protect the property rights of non-Indians by according them due process of law or
protecting individual non-Indian civil rights. Uncertainty increases risk and risk in-
creases the cost of doing business on Indian reservations.
Tribal government patronage systems and the politicization of tribal courts are
significant obstacles to Indian reservation economic development since they
discriminate unfairly against individuals and businesses. A lack of sovereign respon-
sibility deters investment.
Id. at 36.
8. Tribal Sovereign Immunity to Suit
Indian tribes are held to possess attributes of sovereignty. One of these attributes is
sovereign immunity to suit. Of the 487 federally recognized Indian tribes and Alaskan
Native groups, 134 (27%) have Indian Reorganization Act corporate charters which
permit them to sue and be sued. Generally speaking, suits against a tribal sovereign
have only been permitted where there were tribal or Congressional waivers of
sovereign immunity and the remedy did not involve tribal property held in trust.
Sovereign immunity may be raised by tribes as a bar to suits brought against them
by their'own members or by non-members in cases involving civil rights, property,
contracts, or a dispute of any kind.
Sovereign immunity to suit creates risks for businesses who engage in economic ac-
tivity on Indian reservations since it makes actions by tribal governments immune
from challenge and exposes investment to loss where a tribe decides to deny a claim by
raising the bar.
Id. at 37-38.
In order to correct the problem of stagnant reservation economies, the Commission
provided the President with a number of recommendations. Stressing the need to promote
due process of law for those who live and do business within an Indian reservation, the
Commission made three recommendations concerning tribal court systems in general:
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION
ECONOMIES RECOMMENDS
THAT TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS UNDERTAKE A PROCESS OF MODERNIZ-
ING THEIR CONSTITUTIONS TO ACHIEVE AN EFFECTIVE SEPARATION
OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN WHICH THE TRIBAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
CAN OPERATE WITHOUT POLITICAL INTERFERENCE FROM TRIBAL
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/2
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persons about the tribal court system and instilling in them some
faith in the tribal court process that does not seem to exist at this
time. Tribal courts will also have to take a hand in solving this
problem, and it will be difficult if not impossible to instill con-
fidence in a judicial system that does not comport with tradi-
tional notions of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Indian courts are designed to respect the cultural heritage,
rules, and beliefs of Native Americans, but Indian people must
interact with nonmembers of the tribe. Nowhere is this truer than
in obtaining credit. Indian people have their own governments,
including a system of tribal courts. These governments certainly
are vested with authority, but the individual members and
perhaps the tribes as a whole are paying a price for their separate
system of government. This price seems to include not only a
reduction in consumer credit to tribal members, but a corre-
sponding denial of private sector development moneys as well.
GOVERNMENT; AND IN WHICH THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE SEPARATION
BETWEEN THE TRIBAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCES OF
GOVERNMENT.
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION
ECONOMIES RECOMMENDS
THAT TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS UNDERTAKE A PROCESS OF
SEPARATING THEIR CORPORATE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS FROM
POLITICAL OR MANAGEMENT INTERFERENCE BY TRIBAL GOVERN-
MENTS.
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN RESERVATION
ECONOMIES RECOMMENDS
THAT LEGISLATION BE PROVIDED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF
TRIBAL COURT DECISIONS TO THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM WHERE
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY RIGHTS ARE INVOLVED.
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
Even Congress has become involved with determining why reservations remain
economic backwaters. The Senate held a hearing on this problem in 1982. See Oversight
of Economic Development on Indian Reservations: Hearing Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Although the reasons for reserva-
tion economic stagnation were not as succinctly stated in the Select Senate Committee
hearings as in the Commission on Indian Reservation Economies' report, many of the
same root causes surfaced in the Senate hearings. See id. See also Mudd, Jurisdiction and
the Indian Credit Problem: Considerations for a Solution, 33 MONT. L. REV. 307 (1972),
and Schwechten, Epilogue in Spite of the Law: A Social Comment on the Impact of Ken-
nerly and Crow Tribe, 33 MoNT. L. REV. 317 (1972), for early discussions of the possible
relationship between tribal court jurisdiction and a denial of credit to reservation Indians.
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Appendix A
Comprehensive Results of Attorneys' Survey
1. Have you appeared as counsel of record in any collection
action during the past year and, if so, how many cases?
Number of Cases: 1,950
2. Were you plaintiff's counsel in any of these suits and, if
so, please state the percentage of cases in which you
represented a creditor?
1,695 (86.9%) Creditor Cases
3. Were any of these actions before an Indian tribal court
and, if so, how many?
92 (4.7%70)
4. What percentage of your clients were Indian and what
percentage were non-Indian?
Indian: 93 (4.7%) Non-Indian: 1,857 (95.2%)
5. If you have had occasion to appear in tribal court on a
collection matter, please answer the following questions.
However, if you have never been in tribal court on a col-
lection case, please answer question 6.
Were the tribal judge and court personnel competent?
Yes: 15 (60%) No: 10 (40%)
Was the tribal court system fair to both Indian and non-Indian
alike?
Yes: 12 (52%) No: 10 (40%)
No Basis For Comparison: 2 (8%)
Were the tribal court rules of practice and procedure similar to
those in use in the state court system?
Yes: 11 (45.8%) No: 13 (54.2%)
Did you feel comfortable practicing before the tribal court?
Yes: 17 (68%) No: 8 (32%)
Were the results in tribal court comparable to what would have
been achieved had the suit been brought in state court?
Yes: 11 (45.80o0) No: 13 (54.207o)
Based upon your experience, would you recommend use of
tribal court to a non-Indian creditor?
Yes: 11 (45.8%) No: 13 (54.2%)
6. If you have never had an opportunity to appear in tribal
court on a collection matter, please answer the following
questions.
Do you believe that a non-Indian creditor would be




Yes: 21 (16.4%) No: 55 (43%) No Opinion:
52 (40.6%)
Would you expect the tribal court rules of practice and
procedure to be markedly different from those used in
state court?
Yes: 60 (46.9%) No: 36 (28.1%) No Opinion:
32 (25%)
Given the choice between proceeding on behalf of a
non-Indian creditor in .either state or tribal court, would
you recommend use of tribal court if debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 19 (14.8%) No: 74 (57.8%) No Opinion:
35 (27.4%)
7. Would you be interested in a continuing legal education
seminar on tribal court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 62 (37.8%) No: 74 (45.1 %) No Opinion:
28 (17.1%)
8. Would you like to see a law review issue devoted to tribal
court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 92 (61%) No: 37 (24.6%) No Opinion:
22 (14.4%)
Appendix B
Results of Fort Berthold Survey
1. Have you appeared as counsel of record in any collection
action during the past year and, if so, how many cases?
Number of Cases: 217
2. Were you plaintiff's counsel in any of these suits and, if
so, please state the percentage of cases in which you
represented a creditor?
154: (78.9%) Creditor Cases
3. Were any of these actions before an Indian tribal court
and, if so, how many?
38 (17.5%)
4. What percentage of your clients were Indian and what
percentage were non-Indian?
Indian: 14 (6.45%) Non-Indian: 203 (93.55%)
5. If you have had occasion to appear in tribal court on a
collection matter, please answer the following questions.
However, if you have never been in tribal court on a col-
lection case, please answer question 6.
Were the tribal judge and court personnel competent?
Yes: 3 (60%) No: 2 (40%)
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Was the tribal court system fair to both Indian and
non-Indian alike?
Yes: 2 (50%) No: 2 (50%-0)
No Basis for Comparison: 0
Were the tribal court rules of practice and procedure
similar to those in use in the state court system?
Yes: 2 (50%) No: 2 (50%)
Did you feel comfortable practicing before the tribal
court?
Yes: 2 (50%) No: 0
Were the results in tribal court comparable to what
would have been achieved had the suit been brought in
state court?
Yes: 2 (50%) No: 2 (50%)
Based upon your experience, would you recommend
use of tribal court to a non-Indian creditor?
Yes: 2 (50%) No: 2 (50%)
6. If you have never had an opportunity to appear in tribal
court on a collection matter, please answer the following
questions.
Do you believe that a non-Indian creditor would be
fairly treated in tribal court when the debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 1 (16.7%) No: 4 (66.6%) No Opinion: 1
(16.7%)
Would you expect the tribal court rules of practice and
procedure to be markedly different from those used in
state court?
Yes: 2 (33.3%) No: 3 (50%) No Opinion: 1
(16.7%)
Given the choice between proceeding on behalf of a
non-Indian creditor in either state or tribal court, would
you recommend use of tribal court if debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 0 No: 4 (66.6%) No Opinion: 2 (33.3%)
7. Would you be interested in a continuing legal education
seminar on tribal court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 4 (40%) No: 3 (30%) No Opinion: 3
(30%)
8. Would you like to see a law review issue devoted to tribal
court practice and jurisdiction?






Results of Fort Totten Survey
1. Have you appeared as counsel of record in any collection
action during the past year and, if so, how many cases?
Number of Cases: 211
2. Were you plaintiff's counsel in any of these suits and, if
so, please state the percentge of cases in which you
represented a creditor?
184 (87.2%) Creditor Cases
3. Were any of these actions before an Indian tribal court
and, if so, how many?
8 (3.80o)
4. What percentage of your clients were Indian and what
percentage were non-Indian?
Indian: 10 (4.7%) Non-Indian: 201 (95.3o)
5. If you have had occasion to appear in tribal court on a
collection matter, please answer the following questions.
However, if you have never been in tribal court on a col-
lection case, please answer question 6.
Were the tribal judge and court personnel competent?
Yes: 2 (33.3%) No: 4 (66.7%)
Was the tribal court system fair to both Indian and
non-Indian alike?
Yes: 2 (33.3%) No: 4 (66.70o)
Were the tribal court rules of practice and procedure
similar to those in use in the state court system?
Yes: 3 (50%) No: 3 (50%)
Did you feel comfortable practicing before the tribal
court?
Yes: 2 (33.307o) No: 4 (66.707o)
Were the results in tribal court comparable to what
would have been achieved had the suit been brought in
state court?
Yes: 2 (33.3%) No: 4 (66.7%)
Based upon your experience, would you recommend
use of tribal court to a non-Indian creditor?
Yes: 2 (33.30o) No: 4 (66.7%)
6. If you have never had an opportunity to appear in tribal
court on a collection matter, please answer the following
questions.
Do you believe that a non-Indian creditor would be
fairly treated in tribal court when the debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 0 No: 5 (55.6%) No Opinion: 4 (44.400)
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Would you expect the tribal court rules of practice and
procedure to be markedly different from those used in
state court?
Yes: 4 (44.4%) No: 2 (22.2%) No Opinion: 3
(33.3%)
Given the choice between proceeding on behalf of a
non-Indian creditor in either state or tribal court, would
you recommend use of tribal court if debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 0 No: 6 (750%) No Opinion: 2 (25%)
7. Would you be interested in a continuing legal education
seminar on tribal court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 5 (35.7%) No: 8 (57.10%) No Opinion: 1
(7.1%)
8. Would you like to see a law review issue devoted to tribal
court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 10 (71.4/0) No: 2 (14.3%) No Opinion:
2 (14.3%)
Appendix D
Results of Sisseton-Wahpeton (Lake Traverse) Survey
1. Have you appeared as counsel of record in any collection
action during the past year and, if so, how many cases?
Number of Cases: 71
2. Were you plaintiff's counsel in any of these suits and, if
so, please state the percentage of cases in which you
represented a creditor?
59 (830a) Creditor Cases
3. Were any of these actions before an Indian tribal court
and, if so, how many?
0
4. What percentage of your clients were Indian and what
percentage were non-Indian?
Indian: 2 (2.8%) Non-Indian: 69 (97.2%)
5. If you have had occasion to appear in tribal court on a
collection matter, please answer the following questions.
However, if you have never been in tribal court on a col-
lection case, please answer question 6.
Were the tribal judge and court personnel competent?
Yes: 0 No: 0
Was the tribal court system fair to both Indian and
non-Indian alike?




Were the tribal court rules of practice and procedure
similar to those in use in the state court system?
Yes: 0 No: 0
Did you feel comfortable practicing before the tribal
court?
Yes: 0 No: 0
Were the results in tribal court comparable to what
would have been achieved had the suit been brought in
state court?
Yes: 0 No: 0
Based upon your experience, would you recommend
use of tribal court to a non-Indian creditor?
Yes: 0 No: 0
6. If you have never had an opportunity to appear in tribal
court on a collection matter, please answer the following
questions.
Do you believe that a non-Indian creditor would be
fairly treated in tribal court when the debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 0 No: 2 (33.3%) No Opinion: 4 (66.6%)
Would you expect the tribal court rules of practice and
procedure to be markedly different from those used in
state court?
Yes: 3 (50%) No: 1 (16.6%) No Opinion: 2
(33.3%)
Given the choice between proceeding on behalf of a
non-Indian creditor in either state or tribal court, would
you recommend use of tribal court if debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 1 (14%) No: 2 (29%) No Opinion: 4
(57%)
7. Would you be interested in a continuing legal education
seminar on tribal court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 3 (37.5%) No: 5 (62.5%) No Opinion: 0
8. Would you like to see a law review issue devoted to tribal
court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 3 (37.5%) No: 4 (50%) No Opinion: 1
(12.5%)
Appendix E
Results of Standing Rock Survey
1. Have you appeared as counsel of record in any collection
action during the past year and, if so, how many cases?
Number of Cases: 1,408
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2. Were you plaintiff's counsel in any of these suits and, if
so, please state the percentage of cases in which you
represented a creditor?
1,245 (88.4%) Creditor Cases
3. Were any of these actions before an Indian tribal court
and, if so, how many?
18 (1%)
4. What percentage of your clients were Indian and what
percentage were non-Indian?
Indian: 62 (4.4%) Non-Indian: 1,346 (95.6%)
5. If you have had occasion to appear in tribal court on a
collection matter, please answer the following questions.
However, if you have never been in tribal court on a col-
lection case, please answer question 6.
Were the tribal judge and court personnel competent?
Yes: 7 (63.6%) No: 4 (36.4%)
Was the tribal court system fair to both Indian and
non-Indian alike?
Yes: 6 (54.5%) No: 4 (36.4%) No Basis for
Comparison: 1 (9%)
Were the tribal court rules of practice and procedure
similar to those in use in the state court system?
Yes: 5 (45.5%) No: 6 (54.5%)
Did you feel comfortable practicing before the tribal
court?
Yes: 7 (63.6%) No: 4 (36.4%)
Were the results in tribal court comparable to what
would have been achieved had the suit been brought in
state court?
Yes: 4 (40%) No: 6 (60%)
Based upon your experience, would you recommend
use of tribal court to a non-Indian creditor?
Yes: 3 (30%) No: 7 (70%)
6. If you have never had an opportunity to appear in tribal
court on a collection matter, please answer the following
questions.
Do you believe that a non-Indian creditor would be
fairly treated in tribal court when the debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 20 (18.9%) No: 43 (40.6%) No Opinion:
43 (40.6%)
Would you expect the tribal court rules of practice and





Yes: 50 (47.2'o) No: 30 (28.3%) No Opinion:
26 (24.5%)
Given the choice between proceeding on behalf of a
non-Indian creditor in either state or tribal court, would
you recommend use of tribal court if debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 18 (17%) No: 61 (57.5%) No Opinion:
27 (25.5%)
7. Would you be interested in a continuing legal education
seminar on tribal court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 49 (38.6%) No: 56 (44.1%) No Opinion:
22 (17.3%)
8. Would you like to see a law review issue devoted to tribal
court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 73 (63.5%) No: 11 (22.6%) No Opinion:
16 (13.9%)
Appendix F
Results of Turtle Mountain Survey
1. Have you appeared as counsel of record in any collection
action during the past year and, if so, how many cases?
Number of Cases: 43
2. Were you plaintiff's counsel in any of these suits and, if
so, please state the percentage of cases in which you
represented a creditor?
42 (97.6%) Creditor Cases
3. Were any of these actions before an Indian tribal court
and, if so, how many?
28 (65.1%)
4. What percentage of your clients were Indian and what
percentage were non-Indian?
Indian: 5 (11.6%) Non-Indian: 38 (88.7%)
5. If you have had occasion to appear in tribal court on a
collection matter, please answer the following questions.
However, if you have never been in tribal court on a col-
lection case, please answer question 6.
Were the tribal judge and court personnel competent?
Yes: 4 (100%) No: 0
Was the tribal court system fair to both Indian and
non-Indian alike?
Yes: 3 (100%) No: 0
Were the tribal court rules of practice and procedure
similar to those in use in the state court system?
Yes: 3 (75%) No: 1 (25%)
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Did you feel comfortable practicing before the tribal
court?
Yes: 4 (100%) No: 0
Were the results in tribal court comparable to what
would have been achieved had the suit been brought in
state court?
Yes: 3 (750-6) No: 1 (25%)
Based upon your experience, would you recommend
use of tribal court to a non-Indian creditor?
Yes: 4 (100%) No: 0
6. If you have never had an opportunity to appear in tribal
court on a collection matter, please answer the following
questions.
Do you believe that a non-Indian creditor would be
fairly treated in tribal court when the debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 0 No: 1 (100%) No Opinion: 0
Would you expect the tribal court rules of practice and
procedure to be markedly different from those used in
state court?
Yes: 1 (100%) No: 0 No Opinion: 0
Given the choice between proceeding on behalf of a
non-Indian creditor in either state or tribal court, would
you recommend use of tribal court if debtor is an Indian?
Yes: 0 No: 1 (100%) No Opinion: 0
7. Would you be interested in a continuing legal education
seminar on tribal court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 1 (20%) No: 2 (4001o) No Opinion: 2
(40016)
8. Would you like to see a law review issue devoted to tribal
court practice and jurisdiction?
Yes: 2 (50%) No: 1 (25%) No Opinion: 1
(25%)
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